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INTRODUCTION
Each year, the Chief Justice of the United States makes a variety of
appointments to offices in the Article III bureaucracy, filling positions high
and low.1 In 2011, for example, Chief Justice John G. Roberts participated
1

In recent years, the role of the Chief Justice as the judiciary’s administrator in chief has attracted
growing scholarly attention. For a sense of the literature, see Todd E. Pettys, Choosing a Chief Justice:
Presidential Prerogative or a Job for the Court?, 22 J.L. & POL. 231 (2006); Judith Resnik & Lane
Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the
United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006), exploring the Chief’s various powers and questioning
whether they should vest in a single Justice or be shared; Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial
Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 (2004) [hereinafter Ruger,
Appointment Power], detailing the wide-ranging appointment power of the Chief; Theodore W. Ruger,
The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551
(2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical
Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Ruger, FISA], analyzing the Chief’s
appointments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court; and Peter G. Fish, The Office
of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judiciary’s Bicentennial Decade, in THE WHITE
BURKETT MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE (1984) [hereinafter THE
OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE], tracing the growth of the Chief’s administrative authority during the
twentieth century. A variety of factors contribute to the interest. For starters, scholars often view the
judicial behavior of federal judges in general and the Chief in particular as an outgrowth of their
political views. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Scholars devoted to the attitudinal model may find a political undertone
to the exercise of the Chief’s appointment powers. Moreover, scholars have suggested that Justices may
time their retirements to ensure that a president of their own party will choose their successor. See, e.g.,
Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction, in
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 3, 7 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul
D. Carrington eds., 2006) (raising the prospect of strategic retirement in support of term limits for
Supreme Court Justices); cf. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices
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in the appointment of a new director of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),
the research and teaching arm of the federal judiciary.2 And with the 2011
retirement of the head of the Administrative Office (AO) of the United
States Courts, the Chief Justice bore sole responsibility for the appointment
of a successor.3 Apart from these bureaucratic figures, the Chief Justice
also selects the Article III judges, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges who
serve on the various committees of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policymaking body of the federal judiciary over which he
presides at biannual meetings. Finally, the Chief chooses sitting judges to
staff specialty courts, such as the courts established in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Whatever their influence on the
resolution of the cases that come before specialized courts, the Chief’s
appointment powers may give him a significant hand in the development of
Judicial Branch policy.4
Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2012) (careful study casts doubt on strategic retirement theory); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott,
Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1432–36 (2005)
(collecting evidence that tends to refute the strategic retirement thesis). To the extent the strategic
retirement thesis explains the behavior of Chief Justices, critics may worry that the Chief’s
administrative powers will remain in one party’s hands for the foreseeable future.
2
Created in 1967 as the research and training department of the federal judiciary, the Federal
Judicial Center operates under the direction of a board of directors. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2006).
The Judicial Conference elects the members of the board from federal judges serving in the circuit,
district, bankruptcy, and magistrate ranks; the Chief Justice serves as the chair. See id. §§ 620–621. For
a history of the FJC, see Tom C. Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537. The FJC
board selected Judge Jeremy D. Fogel as its director effective October 2011. Judicial Administration
and Organization, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_07_01.html
(last visited May 24, 2013).
3
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) was established in 1939 as the
administrative arm of the federal judiciary. For an account of the AO’s origins, see Peter Graham Fish,
Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599
(1970). For a critique of the judicial bureaucracy, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000), questioning the
bureaucratic role of life-tenured judges and their influence on the legislative process. Federal law
assigns the power to appoint and remove the director of the AO to the Chief Justice. See § 601 (vesting
in the Chief Justice the power to appoint and remove the director and deputy director of the AO, “after
consulting with the Judicial Conference”). Chief Justice Roberts selected Thomas Hogan, a senior
federal district judge from the District of Columbia, as the AO’s new director, effective October 2011.
See New Director of AO Appointed, THIRD BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
TheThirdBranch/11-10-01/New_Director_of_AO_Appointed.aspx.
4
For accounts of the changing makeup of the civil rules advisory committee from one initially
comprised of lawyers and law professors to one now dominated by judges, see Stephen B. Burbank,
Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1714–26 (2004),
assessing scholarship that models the rulemaking process from a public choice perspective. For an
evaluation of the Chief Justice’s use of the appointment power to influence the politics of civil justice
reform within the Article III judiciary, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil
Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 614–23 (2001), providing a case study of civil
justice reform that highlights the Chief’s influence on the process. On the way assignment power can be
used as a lever to influence outcomes, see J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A
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Despite the familiarity of the practice, the power of Congress to vest
the Chief with appointment authority poses a constitutional puzzle. After
setting a default rule of presidential nomination and appointment, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, Article II empowers Congress to
vest the appointment of “inferior” officers in the President acting alone, in
the heads of departments, and in the “Courts of Law.”5 Notably, Article II
makes no provision for the assignment of appointment authority to the
Chief Justice, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution elsewhere
recognizes the existence of that official (in the provision that calls for the
Chief to preside at the Senate’s trial of presidential impeachments).6 So
long as the Judicial Branch offices in question qualify as “inferior” within
the meaning of Article II, the Constitution appears to foreclose the vesting
of appointment authority in the Chief and to require its vesting in the Court
instead.7
Although scholars have criticized modern appointment practices in the
Judicial Branch, the scholarly consensus holds that the vesting of
appointment authority in the Chief does not violate the Constitution. In the
leading assessment of the Chief’s appointment power, Professor Theodore
Ruger concludes that the practice is not “unconstitutional” in the modern
sense that a federal court should invalidate legislation conveying such
power.8 He bases this conclusion on a variety of considerations, including
the gradual growth in the powers of the Chief over time and the plausible
textual case for treating the “court of law” as synonymous with the Chief
Justice of that court. As Professor Ruger notes, district courts in the
nineteenth century often employed a single district judge, making the

Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 724–28 (1994), examining the use of the assignment
power to influence the way judges decide cases in Japan.
5
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a selection of the vast literature on the separation of powers and
the role of the Appointments Clause, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008), tracing the exercise
of presidential power over time to assess its consistency with the unitary executive thesis; Steven G.
Calabresi & Joan E. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of
Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); and John F. Manning,
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011), arguing against the
use of presumptions in resolving disputes over the separation of powers.
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
7
As we shall see, early practice at the Supreme Court makes clear that court clerks are to be
regarded as inferior officers within the meaning of this provision. See infra text accompanying notes
153–66; see also Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 243 (1839) (treating the district court clerk as
an inferior officer). The Court itself has held that special judges appointed to serve on the Tax Court
qualify as inferior officers rather than employees. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
8
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 351, 367–70.
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“court” and the “judge” one and the same.9 Ruger also points to Freytag v.
Commissioner,10 which upheld the power of the chief judge of the Tax
Court to appoint inferior officers to serve as special judges on that court.
Although the Court divided on one interpretive issue,11 Ruger notes that the
Court “had no trouble” with the exercise of the appointing authority by the
chief judge of the Tax Court rather than by the court itself.12 Professor
Ruger’s analysis may have helped to persuade Professor Resnik that the
Chief Justice’s appointment powers were, as she and Lane Dilg concluded,
unwise, but not unconstitutional.13
In this Article, I explore the possibility that, notwithstanding scholarly
consensus and entrenched practice, the text of the Constitution may well
mean what it says in authorizing the Court, as a “court of law,” but not the
Chief Justice to serve as an approved recipient of the power to appoint
inferior officers. There are two reasons to believe this might be so, one
historical and one structural. As for history, the evidence suggests that the
decision to authorize the assignment of appointment power to the courts,
instead of the judges who staff them, may have been part of a wide-ranging
effort during the early republic to rethink the nature and perquisites of
judicial office.14 Throughout the eighteenth century, judicial officers earned
income from salary, from fees paid by litigants who appeared before the
court, and from the sale of inferior offices within the “gift” or patronage
power of the judge.15 Nonsalary perquisites grew controversial during the
run-up to the Revolution, as the colonists chafed under the burden of

9

See id. at 369 (treating the reference to “Courts of Law” as a distinction without a difference in
light of the practice of staffing district courts with a single judge); see also Fish, supra note 1 (noting
the district court analogy).
10
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
11
As Ruger observes, the debate in Freytag focused on the majority’s conclusion that Congress
could invest the non-Article III Tax Court with the appointment power; the concurring opinion of
Justice Scalia argued that Article III courts alone could be given such power. Nonetheless, Justice
Scalia would have upheld the appointments by envisioning the Tax Court as the head of an executive
department. See id. at 920 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). But cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010) (concluding that a multimember board could
act as a department “head” within the meaning of Article III).
12
Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 370. Perhaps the Justices’ awareness of their own
Chief’s appointing role (and their reluctance to cast doubt on its propriety) helped to generate the
unarticulated consensus.
13
See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1619 n.188.
14
See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008) (finding that by 1787, frustration and criticisms of fee-based
judicial compensation had resulted in state statutes and constitutional provisions addressing the matter).
15
See Part III.A–B. For an account, see DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727–
1875: THE RESHAPING OF A PROFESSIONAL ELITE (1982). A tabular presentation of the value of office
sales in England, drawn from Duman’s work, appears below at Table 1.
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multiple fee-paid offices.16 Among the more colorful indictments in the
Declaration of Independence was its claim that the Crown “has erected a
multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our
people, and eat out their substance.”17
Earlier work contends that Article III may have presumptively
foreclosed the practice of allowing federal judges to collect fees from the
litigants who appear before the federal courts.18 Article II may complement
the no-fees assumptions of Article III19 by adding a no-office-sales proviso
that prevents judges from securing additional compensation through the
exercise of patronage power over appointments to inferior offices. By
providing for Congress to vest the appointment power in courts, the
Framers of Article II neatly clarified that the act of appointment was to be a
transparent part of the public work of the court. By depriving the chief or
any individual judge of the appointment power, moreover, the provision
may have signaled a desire to foreclose the sale of inferior office for private
gain. As was the case with the early implementation of the compensation
provisions of Article III, which featured a move away from fee-paid
compensation,20 Congress implemented the Article II limitation in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 by assigning appointment powers to courts rather
than judges in keeping with this new conception of the judicial office as a
public trust.21 Early practice, overseen by the nation’s first Chief Justice,
John Jay, confirms the perceived importance of court-based appointments.
The structural argument complements the historical evidence. Article
III creates a single Supreme Court, places it atop the federal judicial
hierarchy, and requires all other courts and tribunals erected or appointed
by Congress to remain inferior to that Court. As noted elsewhere, the
related requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority together suggest
that the Court must retain the power to oversee the work of the judicial

16

In addition to salary, colonial governors could earn substantial, additional income from judicial
and administrative fees. Lower officeholders often received fee payments as well from sources such as
marriage fees and liquor license fees. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 8–9 & nn.34–37.
17
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). For an account, see EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 115–17 (1950),
detailing the British government’s creation of new courts of admiralty and commissioners of customs in
the colonies, the fees they were paid, and the subsequent colonial protests that inspired the indictment.
18
See Pfander, supra note 14, at 4, 14.
19
See id. at 16–19 & nn.73–91 (offering textual and historical evidence that Article III precludes
fee-based compensation and recounting an exchange between Gouverneur Morris and James Madison
at the Constitutional Convention that appears to assume salary-based judicial compensation).
20
See id. at 24–26 (describing federal law that allowed federal officials to collect fees at the same
rate as state officials but specifically foreclosed payment of “fees to judges”).
21
See Karen Orren, The Work of Government: Recovering the Discourse of Office in Marbury v.
Madison, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 60 (1994) (recounting changes in the conception of office as property
that began during the early republic).
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system.22 These powers of oversight may extend to state courts, when
constituted as tribunals within the meaning of Article I,23 to federal
agencies exercising judicial power,24 and to lower federal courts,25 and may
well encompass a power to review lower court decisions in the wake of
congressional restrictions on the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction.26
Under Article III, the Court bears ultimate responsibility for the way in
which the judicial department exercises the judicial power of the United
States.27
The appointment provision of Article II underscores the Court’s
special role as the head of the federal judicial department by providing that
Congress can assign the appointment of inferior officers to courts of law.
An inferior officer must be inferior to a superior and Article III makes clear
that the Court, rather than the Chief Justice, occupies the relevant position
of superiority. The Court’s departmental supremacy explains why one
cannot defend current arrangements by regarding the Chief Justice as the
“Head[] of [a] Department” within the meaning of Article II. Such a view
would portray the FJC, the AO, and the other components of the Article III
bureaucracy as separate administrative agencies over which the Chief
exercises administrative oversight. But while Congress has the power to
create department heads with appointment power, such officials must
report to a superior official or body and ultimately to the President. For the
Chief Justice, acting within the judicial department, the relevant reporting
obligation runs not to the President but to the Supreme Court itself.

22

See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (2009) (making a general argument that all federal tribunals must
remain inferior to the Supreme Court and subject to its oversight and control); James E. Pfander &
Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2011) (exploring the
Scottish antecedents to the hierarchical features of the Article III judiciary).
23
See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s supremacy
operates in relation to state courts).
24
See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (arguing that Article I tribunals must remain inferior to
the federal judiciary and ultimately to the Supreme Court).
25
See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise
Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000).
26
See Pfander, supra note 23, at 237 (arguing that as a result of jurisdiction-stripping legislation
that denies inferior federal courts jurisdiction over specific federal claims, state courts technically
become federal tribunals with original jurisdiction subject to Supreme Court oversight); see also
Pfander & Birk, supra note 22, at 1622–23 (exploring the growing view that Congress may alter the
Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction but may not “deprive the Court of the discretionary oversight
that inheres in its supremacy”).
27
The Court’s own decisions offer important support for this conception of the Court as the final
exponent of the judicial department’s exercise of judicial power. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“Within that [judicial] hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not
(unless the time for appeal has expired) the final word of the department as a whole.”).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly sketches the Chief’s
appointment powers, explores some of the criticisms their exercise has
attracted, and examines the defense of their constitutionality. Part II
examines the origins and early implementation of Article II’s provision for
appointments by “courts of law,” placing the provision in the context of
post-revolutionary disdain for the corrupt office selling and fee-based
compensation of the English and colonial judicial systems. Part II explores
the history of the Court’s early practice, which was consistently court
centered, and links the provision for appointment by the courts to the
hierarchical structure of the third branch of government, which calls for the
Court to oversee the department’s exercise of the judicial function. Part III
returns to the constitutional puzzle, showing that the combined force of
history and structure cast doubt on the Chief’s role. After assessing some
possible work-arounds and concluding that they fail to address the
concerns, Part III concludes with some thoughts on how to make the
transition from a Chief-based system of appointments to one in which the
Court performs an oversight function.
I. THE APPOINTMENT POWERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Congress has given the Chief Justice of the United States power to fill
a wide range of offices within the judicial bureaucracy. In addition to his
power to appoint such figures as the director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, the Chief serves as the chair of the board of
directors of the Federal Judicial Center and plays a role in selection of the
FJC’s director.28 For help with various administrative chores, the Chief also
appoints an administrative assistant who works at the Supreme Court.29
Depending on the Chief, the administrative assistant can play a substantial
role in the development of Judicial Branch policy.30 Chief Justice Burger, in
particular, was thought to have delegated significant authority to his
administrative assistant, Mark Cannon.31

28

28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he Chief Justice of the United States, who shall be the
permanent Chairman of the Board . . . .”); id. § 624 (“The Board is authorized . . . to appoint and fix the
duties of the Director and the Deputy Director of the Federal Judicial Center, who shall serve at the
pleasure of the board . . . .”).
29
See id. § 677(a)–(b); Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1590 & nn.45–46 (discussing the creation
of the administrative assistant position at Chief Justice Burger’s request through § 677 (a)–(b)).
30
While Chief Justice Burger’s administrative assistant served from the creation of the position to
the end of Burger’s tenure, a period of fourteen years, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited the tenures of his
administrative assistants to two- to five-year terms. Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1623–24 & n.211.
31
Id. at 1623–24 & n.210 (citing concern with Cannon’s authority as a factor in Justice Rehnquist’s
decision to impose term limits on his assistants). In Cannon’s own description of his duties, see Mark
W. Cannon, Judicial Administration: Why Should We Care?, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 521, 531–32, he lists:
maintain relations with the bureaucracy, advise the Chief, brief the Chief on the literature, and relieve
the Chief of “administrative detail.”
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In addition to the power to appoint officials within the judicial
bureaucracy, the Chief exercises control over the appointment of the
members of the committees that do much of the initial work in formulating
policy for the Article III judiciary.32 Formal policymaking responsibility
falls to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which meets in March
and September every year.33 The Chief presides at meetings of the Judicial
Conference but does not pick its members.34 According to statute, the
Conference consists of the chief judge of each circuit court of appeals, a
district judge from each regional circuit (elected by a vote of her peers),
and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade.35 Between the
March and September meetings, the Conference acts through an executive
committee made up of seven members of the Conference, which the Chief
appoints.36
The formulation of Judicial Conference policy begins at the committee
level. The Conference consists of some two dozen committees, each of
which has jurisdiction over a specific set of issues and each of which
consists of a number of Article III judges who meet biannually.37 Best
known, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
presides over a variety of rulemaking committees, such as those that work
up recommended amendments to the rules of civil procedure, appellate
procedure, bankruptcy procedure, criminal procedure, and so forth.38 Less
32

For a count of Judicial Conference committees, putting the number at twenty-five in 2009, see
Burbank et al., supra note 1. See also Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1597 (finding that though statute
only grants the Chief Justice authority to appoint members of the Standing Committee, the Chief Justice
appoints the members of the various rules committees).
33
See Sessions, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Sessions
.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013).
34
§ 331 (“[The Chief Justice] shall preside at such conference which shall be known as the Judicial
Conference . . . .”).
35
Id.
36
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last
visited May 24, 2013) (“The seven-member Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference serves as
the senior executive arm of the Conference . . . .”). The director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts serves as an ex-officio, nonvoting member of the Executive Committee and brings
the roster total to eight. See Organization, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
JudicialConference/Organization.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013); see also Two New Members Named
to Judicial Conference’s Executive Committee, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.uscourts.
gov/News/NewsView/10-12-28/Two_New_Members_Named_to_Judicial_Conference’s_Executive_
Committee.aspx (listing the number of committee members as eight and including the AO director).
37
See Federal Court Governance and Administration: National, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.
fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/FCGA1 (last visited May 24, 2013); see also Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at
1597 & n.81 (detailing the “more than two dozen” Judicial Conference committees as of 2006).
38
See Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
and Its Advisory Rules Committees, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, VOL. 1, § 440.10, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Procedures_for_Rules_Cmtes.pdf (requiring the
Judicial Conference “to publish the procedures that govern the work of the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (the ‘Standing Committee’) and its advisory committees on the Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure and on the Evidence Rules”).
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well-known committees oversee such matters as court administration,
courthouse construction, federal–state jurisdiction, the federal defenders
program, and magistrate judges.39 Acting on recommendations from the
director of the AO, the Chief appoints the chair and all of the members of
these committees. Committee members serve for three-year terms with the
prospect, often realized,40 of reappointment to a second three-year term.41 In
a typical year, the Chief may make some ten to fifteen such appointments.42
The Chief also appoints the judges who sit on several specialty courts
in the United States. Perhaps most visibly, the Chief appoints members of
the two courts identified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.43
Such courts sit to review, in the first instance and on appeal, the
government’s ex parte applications for warrants to conduct specified kinds
of electronic surveillance.44 The judges of these FISA courts, drawn from
the ranks of active Article III judges, typically serve for a term of seven
years.45 They often meet at a secure location at the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C.46 Other specialty courts to which the Chief makes termlimited appointments include the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
and the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.47
39

See, e.g., Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. CTS.
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.
aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/2011-09.pdf (recording the activities of several
of these committees at the September 2011 meeting).
40
In September of 2011, Chief Justice Roberts extended the terms of the chairs of the Committee
on Defender Services, Committee on Information Technology, and Committee on Intercircuit
Assignments. See, e.g., Carlyn Kolker, Chief Justice Names Judges to Policy Group Posts, THOMSON
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/09_-_
September/Chief_justice_names_judges_to_policy_group_posts.
41
See Committees, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/
Committees.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013) (specifying term lengths and the option of reappointment).
42
The Judicial Conference lists some seventeen committee members whose terms began in 2011.
See Committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 2011), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2011_Rules_Comms.pdf; see also Kolker, supra note 40
(reporting the appointment of eight committee members and the renewal of three committee members’
terms in September 2011).
43
50 U.S.C § 1803(a)–(b) (2006); see also Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 243–45 (describing the
statutory history of the eleven-judge FISA court and the three judge FISA court of review).
44
According to Ruger, the two FISA courts consider government requests for warrants under a
specialized probable cause standard requiring a lesser showing of cause than that required under the
Fourth Amendment standard. See Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 243–44 & nn.15–16.
45
FISA court judges are limited to serving a single, staggered term. § 1803(d); Ruger, FISA, supra
note 1, at 244.
46
See § 1803(a) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall publicly designate 11 district court judges . . . of
whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a
court . . . .”).
47
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2006) (“The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of
seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice . . . .”). One can, of
course, argue that the Judicial Panel exercises only a modest slice of Article III judicial power, passing
on petitions for the transfer of civil actions with “one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in
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Needless to say, the Chief today does not sell the offices over which
he exercises appointment power. But critics have suggested that the Chief
might use the appointment power to influence policy. Perhaps most
significantly, critics argue that the Chief can staff specialty courts and
Judicial Conference committees with an eye to selecting judges with an
agreeable conception of sound judicial policy. Building on the attitudinal
model of judicial behavior, some scholars believe that Chief Justice
Rehnquist adopted a partisan approach to his judicial appointments.48
Working on the assumption that the party of the nominating president
reveals important information about the ideology of the judge, scholars
have observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed more Republicans
than Democrats to fill crucial judicial offices,49 particularly on the Special
Division of the D.C. Circuit, which exercised control over the appointment
of independent prosecutors.50 Whatever the validity of the attitudinal model
in this (or other) contexts, the specter of a politicized appointment process
will linger as long as the Chief makes the appointments himself.51
Critics also worry that the Chief’s administrative responsibilities may
inform his views as a judge on a multimember judicial body. As Professor
Resnik has observed, Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to deny
bankruptcy judges Article III status in the 1978 legislation that expanded
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.52 Later, when parties to a breach
of contract claim challenged the assignment of judicial power to
bankruptcy judges with the non-Article III status he advocated, Chief
Justice Burger defended the legislation from a constitutional challenge and
different districts” to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings. See id. § 1407 (a)–(c). But it
seems unlikely that Congress could assign the transfer function to a non-Article III tribunal. See
Pfander, supra note 24, at 762–66 (highlighting a formalist strand of the Court’s Article III
jurisprudence that would call into question an assignment of the transfer power to Article I tribunals).
For the appointment provisions of the Alien and Terrorist Removal Court, see 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a)
(2006) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the United
States judicial circuits . . . .”).
48
In its strongest form, the attitudinal model holds that judges vote to advance their political
ideology (or that of their appointing president) rather than to apply or refine the law. See SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 1.
49
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 393, tbl.2 (listing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
appointments by party).
50
See id. at 344, 379 n.156 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointment of Judge David
Sentelle to lead the Special Division and the Division’s subsequent appointment of Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate President Clinton).
51
To be sure, vesting appointment power in the Court rather than the Chief would not necessarily
eliminate the prospect of a politicized appointment process. Many regard the Court’s work today as
highly political. But the give and take associated with the deliberative process on a collegial Court
could bring greater perceived balance to the selection process. See infra text accompanying notes 240–
42.
52
See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1611–12 (tracing Chief Justice Burger’s influence on
Congress and the Administrative Office as the two entities negotiated the status of bankruptcy judges
and their jurisdictional authority).
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dissented from a decision invalidating the statute in part.53 A similar
blurring of roles has been said to have occurred under the stewardship of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Chief worked within the judicial bureaucracy
to articulate a policy of opposition to the expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction and then voted as a member of the Supreme Court to invalidate
the Violence Against Women Act on the ground that it exceeded
congressional power in criminalizing gender-based violence.54 Professor
Resnik contends that, in each instance, views that the Chief formed as chief
court administrator may have influenced the exercise of the Chief’s judicial
function as a Justice of the Supreme Court.55
Despite these criticisms, the weight of scholarly opinion holds that the
Chief’s bureaucratic role should not be regarded as unconstitutional.56 A
variety of considerations inform this constitutional consensus. First, the
Chief’s powers have grown up over time, beginning in the nineteenth
century, gaining momentum with the power Congress conferred on Chief
Justice Taft to transfer judges between regions, and evolving into a practice
so extensive that it could be difficult to uproot.57 Second, in the most nearly
analogous case, Freytag, the Court upheld the power of Congress to allow
the chief judge of the Tax Court to appoint judges of that body.58 While the
Justices disagreed as to whether the non-Article III Tax Court would
53

See id. at 1612 (quoting Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982), where he insisted that “a radical restructuring of the
present system of bankruptcy adjudication” was not a necessary congressional response to the plurality
decision).
54
See id. at 1613 (arguing that the creation of the new cause of action spurred action by the Judicial
Conference, presided over by the Chief Justice, to create the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based
Violence to review the proposed legislation). For a full account, see Judith Resnik, The Programmatic
Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
269 (2000).
55
Professor Resnik suggests that rather than speaking of the “Rehnquist Court,” scholars should
refer to the period as the “Rehnquist Judiciary” in recognition of the Chief Justice’s broad influence
over judiciary matters extending beyond adjudication. Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1615. One can,
of course, question the claim that Chief Justice Rehnquist formed his view of the Violence Against
Women Act in the course of his administrative work. The Rehnquist Court inaugurated a series of
federalism-based restraints on congressional power in such cases as New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Chief Justice
supported these restrictions and had long called on the Court to define limits on the commerce power.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579–80 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
56
See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1; Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 368–372.
57
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 350–51 (describing the Taft-era transfer
authority as a precursor to the modern appointments to specialized courts). For an account of Chief
Justice Taft’s efforts—largely successful—to create a more bureaucratized and independent judiciary,
see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 199–212 (2012), describing Chief Justice Taft’s success in securing passage of the
Judicial Conference Act and the Judiciary Act of 1925, which helped to transform the federal judiciary
into a more hierarchical, institutionally self-sufficient branch.
58
See infra notes 209–15 and accompanying text.
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qualify as a “court of law” within the meaning of Article II, they did not
contest the power of the chief judge to act for the court in making the
appointments. This tendency to equate the court with the chief may explain
the general perception that the Framers could not have meant to draw a
sharp line between the administrative work of a multimember tribunal and
the work of its senior member.
Yet one can question each element of the constitutional consensus.
While Chief Justice Taft certainly worked to expand the office of Chief
Justice, likening it to the position of Lord Chancellor in England,59 one can
point to an earlier practice quite at odds with Chief Justice Taft’s approach.
As we will see, the precedent-conscious Chief Justice Jay took pains to
ensure that the Court as such would act as the appointing agency for all
inferior officers and deliberately declined to assert control over
appointments himself.60 Chief Justice Jay’s early conduct in the office,
moreover, appears to reflect a perception that the line between the Court, as
the appointing agency, and the person holding the position of Chief Justice,
was one of constitutional dimension.61 By calling for the court to appoint,
rather than the chief judge, the Framers may have meant to signal that
official appointments were a public trust rather than a perquisite within the
gift of the Justices that could be exploited for private gain. The next Part
explores the origins and early implementation of the provision for
appointment by the “courts of law.”
II. THE ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURTS OF
LAW PROVISION
The provision authorizing Congress to vest appointment authority in
courts of law emerged late in the work of the Philadelphia Convention and
attracted little attention in the ratification debates. Yet we have reason to
believe that the choice of the court as the appointing entity was part of a
series of decisions that sought to eliminate corrupting features from judicial
office. In this part of the Article, I sketch the nature of judicial office in
59

See CROWE, supra note 57, at 210 (describing England’s chancellor as Chief Justice Taft’s
model judge).
60
See infra text accompanying notes 147–59. For the view that early actions by the Supreme Court
and other departments of the government set precedents that shape constitutional understanding, see
Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1745, 1786–87 (2006), discussing the significance of early practice in defining the meaning of the
Constitution and noting in particular Chief Justice Jay’s attitude toward the constitutionality of circuit
riding, and Manning, supra note 5, at 2033–34 & n.469, describing the Jay Court’s refusal to issue
advisory opinions as a foundational precedent. Manning describes the underlying logic as crediting an
interpretation adopted soon after the enactment of a text in recognition that “[a]lterations in the legal
and cultural landscape may make the meaning hard [for future generations] to recover.” Id. at 2033
(alterations in original) (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)).
61
See infra text accompanying notes 150–52.
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eighteenth-century England and in the colonies, explaining why the
reliance on fee-paid compensation and patronage-based appointments grew
controversial among the members of the founding generation. I also
explore the appointment provisions of the state constitutions, particularly
those in New York, where the author of Article II (Gouverneur Morris) and
the nation’s first Chief Justice, John Jay, wrestled with the problem of how
to structure appointments of inferior judicial officers. Finally, I sketch the
development of Article II, concluding that the choice of the court as the
approved recipient of appointment power may have been meant to further
the Framers’ decision to eliminate non-salary-based compensation for
judges and to create a hierarchical judicial system with a single Supreme
Court.62
A. Judicial Office in England and the Colonies
Judicial office in eighteenth-century England, at least for the lucky few
who were appointed to serve on one of the three superior courts of common
law or as chancellor, was a source of handsome financial reward.63 Chief
judges in particular earned at least three sources of income, all of which
were regarded as a species of property attached to the judicial office itself.64
First, the judges were paid a salary. This had been a matter of some
controversy; the Stuarts had claimed the right to pay the salary of their
appointed judges and to commission them during pleasure.65 The Act of
Settlement (1701) provided instead that the judges were to serve during
good behavior (which meant they were not subject to at-will dismissal by
the Crown) and that the salaries were to be paid by the Parliament.66 While
often associated with judicial independence, the Act of Settlement might be

62

The evidence collected here suggests that judges were among the first federal officials who were
placed on salary and denied other perquisites of office. Nicholas Parrillo reports in a forthcoming booklength treatment of the subject that salarization generally came much later for executive enforcement
officers (like state and local tax investigators, custom-house investigators, prosecutors, prison
managers, and so forth) and for Executive Branch adjudicators (like officers deciding applications for
naturalizations, homesteads, or pensions). See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE:
THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (forthcoming 2013).
63
The superior courts of common law, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, each
employed four judges, one of whom was the chief judge (or justice) and the remainder of whom were
associate (or puisne) judges. These twelve judges enjoyed tenure during good behavior under the Act of
Settlement (1701). See James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1235 &
n.37 (2007) (citing the Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2. (Eng.)).
64
See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 111.
65
See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061,
1063–64 (2007).
66
Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.); see Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 n.30
(noting that the Act’s establishment of judicial salary did not preclude litigant fees).
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viewed as expressing a preference for judicial dependence on Parliament
rather than on the Crown.67
Apart from salaries, superior court judges earned income in the form
of fees, paid by litigants as part of the costs of litigation.68 Fees varied from
court to court in terms of their corrupting influence. In the superior courts,
the fees were paid by the losing party (in keeping with the loser-pays
system in England) and thus did not tend to influence the outcome of the
dispute.69 The judges were paid their fees no matter which way they ruled
on the merits. In the court of admiralty, by contrast, judicial fees could
depend on the outcome. Thus, admiralty judges earned substantial fees
when they condemned a vessel as lawful prize but far less when they
acquitted the vessel of wrongdoing.70 This incentive to condemn would
violate due process today;71 it was no more popular in colonial America as
the mode by which the vice-admiralty courts enforced various mercantile
regulations.72
Judges supplemented fees and salaries by exercising control over the
appointment of individuals to offices within their gift.73 Judges with a
67

See Martin Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English Experience, 55 N.C. L. REV. 577, 621–
22 (1977).
68
Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing the different stages in the litigation process—including
commencement, process, and jury empanelment—at which fees were incurred); see infra Table 1.
69
Pfander, supra note 14, at 8 n.32 (discussing the origins of the loser pays system in England and
contrasting the system to the “American” rule requiring that each party pay its own attorneys’ fees).
70
See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 115 (noting the large disparities in British admiralty judges’
incomes during times of war and peace as a result of the cut judges received when granting an award in
wartime prize cases; this led to an income increase of up to £5500 for the judges during wartime).
71
See Pfander, supra note 14, at 10 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and Connally v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam), Supreme Court cases that invalidated a conviction and a
warrant because the judges received a fee only when they convicted the defendant or issued the
warrant).
72
On the controversial character of the admiralty courts during the run-up to independence, see
CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960), and
David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–
1776, 16 WM & MARY Q. 459 (1959).
73
On the origins of office sales in early Norman history, linking office to a form of feudal property
and describing its corrupting influence, see 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
246–51 (7th ed. rev. 1956). For criticisms of the sale of office, see G.E. AYLMER, THE KING’S
SERVANTS: THE CIVIL SERVICE OF CHARLES I 1625–1642, at 225–30 (rev. ed. 1974), describing the
impeachment of Buckingham in 1626 for corrupt sale of office and setting forth a series of
contemporary criticisms of the practice including the concern that wealth, rather than merit, would
determine advancement. Efforts to reform the sale of office did not succeed in the early modern period,
in part due to the wide range of exceptions; thus, an English act of Parliament in 1552 expressly saved
the rights of the several chief justices to retain the proceeds of office sales. See AYLMER, supra, at 228.
Reform efforts finally took hold in the early nineteenth century under the influence of Jeremy Bentham.
See HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 248, 262–64 (describing the reforms and attributing them to Bentham). By
the time the reform efforts gained steam, several inferior officers of King’s Bench enjoyed absolute
sinecures; they did no work at all (having delegated it all to deputies who were also paid through the
fees they collected). See id. at 257–59 (reporting that, by 1810, fifteen offices in the Court of King’s
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substantial patronage in offices could secure revenue in two ways.74 They
could sell the offices outright, bargaining with the purchaser in the
expectation that the appointment to a sinecure would provide an annuity for
the life of the individual installed.75 Alternatively, they could appoint a
member of their own immediate or extended family to the post, thus
ensuring that the income flowed to objects of the judge’s affection.76 The
value of patronage obviously depended on the length of the appointing
judge’s service; more offices would become vacant and require
reappointment over the course of a long tenure on the bench. Like fees, this
form of income was quite unevenly divided. While the Lord Chancellor
and the two chief justices (those of King’s Bench and Common Pleas)
derived substantial income from official patronage, the nine puisne (or
associate) justices of the common law courts derived considerably less
income from litigant fees and the sale of offices.77
Historians have reckoned the value of these three sources of judicial
income. According to Duman, at around the turn of the nineteenth century,
the annual value of judicial office was as follows78:

Bench were either absolute or partial sinecures). No wonder reformers complained of the law’s expense
and delay. For an engaging defense of fee-paid office, see DOUGLAS W. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (2012), arguing that the sale of office was a plausibly efficient adaptation to a premodern
world in which the measurement of official performance was quite difficult.
74
See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 116 (detailing the patronage received by the chancellor, the chief
justice of King’s Bench, and the chief justice of Common Pleas).
75
If not sold outright, a judge might have chosen to keep the office for himself as a supplemental
income. See id.
76
Logically, the more prized offices were often gifted to close relatives or sons of the judges, while
judges gave the less important offices to extended family and friends. See id. Even where the office was
in the gift of a lower ranking figure, such as the Master of the Rolls in chancery, it was customary for
the purchaser of an office to pay a douceur or brokerage fee to the chancellor. See AYLMER, supra note
73, at 227.
77
See infra Table 1.
78
See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 105.
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TABLE 1: ANNUAL VALUE OF ENGLISH JUDICIAL OFFICES CIRCA 1790
Court

Office

Salary79

Fees

Patronage

Total

Lord Chancellor

£5000

£500080

£15,00081

£25,000

Master of the Rolls

£4000

£250082

£6900*83

£13,400

Chief Justice

£4000

£300084

£23,00085

£30,000

Associate Justices

£2400

£50086

–

£2900

Chief Justice

£3500

£110087

£10,00088

£14,600

Associate Justices

£2400

–

–

£2400

Chief Baron

£3500

–

£420089

£7700

Associate Barons

£2400

–

–

£2400

Chancery

King’s
Bench

Common
Pleas

Exchequer

79
See id. at 112–13 tbl.9. Salary figures are based on Duman’s projections for the year 1790 for all
offices except the Master of Rolls, whose salary is unknown for that year. The salary of the Master of
Rolls is based on Duman’s figure from 1799. The salaries for associate justices of the King’s Bench,
associate justices of the Court of Common Pleas, and the associate of the Exchequer are based on
Duman’s projections for puisne judges and barons in 1790.
80
Id. at 111. The Lord Chancellor’s remunerations were also augmented by income collected for
serving as speaker of the house. In addition to the £5000 collected in fees, Lord Hardwicke received
nearly £1100 per annum from 1736 and 1755 for officiating as speaker. Id. at 114.
81
Id. at 116 (based on Duman’s finding of an 1810 House of Commons committee report
documenting that the Lord Chancellor received £6391 for offices in his gift and that relatives of former
chancellors held offices worth an additional £8790 per year).
82
Id. at 114. From 1751–1753, the Master of the Rolls received an annual fee between £2400–
£2500 from the Hanaper Officer.
83
Id. at 120. *Represents patronage figure for the first half of the eighteenth century for a total of
thirteen offices.
84
Id. at 119.
85
Id. The patronage figure for the chief justice of the King’s Bench is based on Duman’s annual
projection for the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries, which represents a period prior to England’s
reformation of the patronage and sinecure system in England.
86
Id. at 115 (based on an account by Sydney Stafford Smythe, a puisne judge during the reign of
George I). The figure listed represents an average of fees from £426 in 1750 and £731 in 1754.
87
Id. at 120.
88
Id.
89
Id. (this figure is an estimate calculated by figuring the amount per office that the Master of Rolls
received (£530) and multiplying this amount by the 8 officials the Chief Baron was able to appoint). For
the Master of Rolls patronage figure, see supra note 83 and supra Table 1.
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As these figures reveal, chief justices often earned more from fees and
patronage than from straight salary. Not captured in these figures, though
doubtless significant, royal pensions were often made available to judges
after they retired.90
Eventually, a reform-minded Parliament in the nineteenth century
conducted investigations of fees and patronage and made changes in the
rules.91 The general thrust of the reforms was to seek greater transparency
and greater reliance on salary-based compensation. Viewing fees and
patronage as sources of make-work and corruption that tended to delay and
multiply the cost of judicial proceedings, Parliament attempted to wean the
judges away from these sources of income.92 Reform-minded Americans
beat their English cousins to the punch; many of the post-revolutionary
state constitutions had already attempted to regulate the collection of
official fees and perquisites of office.93
B. Sale of Office in the Colonies and States
The colonies of British North America had experience with fee-paid
offices, with the use of the appointment power to influence political
allegiance, and with the multiplication of offices aimed more at providing
income to elites than services to the people. Governors earned a salary and
a variety of fees, including fees for performing judicial functions.94 In
addition, governors earned an income and a measure of influence through
the disposition of the many offices in their gift.95 Some governors, in fact,
never moved to America; they simply sold the office to a deputy and
90

In particular, the chancellor and the two chief justices often received “royal patents,” which
provided their retirement pensions. It was not until 1799 that an official pension system provided an
annual pension of £4000 for the chancellor, £3000 for the chief justices and Chief Baron, £2500 for the
Master of the Rolls, and £2000 for all other judges. See DUMAN, supra note 15, at 121, 124 n.49.
Obviously, a pension system that was subject to some royal discretion could influence the behavior of
judges seeking to ensure pension eligibility after retirement.
91
See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 73, at 262 (finding that salary reform and the elimination of many
sinecure offices were the immediate result of the publication of such investigations).
92
Id. at 647 (“Payment by fees, saleable offices, and sinecure places were the predominant
characteristics of a bureaucracy which could not be defended even upon historical grounds.”).
93
See infra text accompanying notes 108–10.
94
See 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA: 1713–1728, at 158–59 (William L. Saunders
ed., 1886) [hereinafter RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA] (complaining that the governor is “by his
Commission made Captain General, Chancellor, Chief Justice, and Admiral, which are great and
different powers, and can never be justly executed by one person”); MICHAEL KAMMEN, COLONIAL
NEW YORK: A HISTORY 201–02 (1975) (cataloging the range of salaries, fees, bribes and other
perquisites collected by the colonial governor of New York).
95
See 2 RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 94, at 159 (complaining that a governor who
has obtained the office through influence, rather than merit, would sell “his judgments and decrees to
the highest bidder, and all places both Civill and Millitary without any regard to the fitness of the
persons to execute them . . . . He protects the inferior Officers and others who pay him yearly pencions,
in the neglect and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and prosecutions against them are in
vain.”).
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collected a portion of the salary while living in England. The same was true
of customs officials, who often sold the post to a deputy and stayed at
home.96
We lack a detailed history of the sale of office in British North
America, but the evidence suggests that the practice was widespread and
occasionally controversial. We have the following vivid set of grievances
from the lower house of the Maryland assembly, which first criticized the
governor for allowing excessive fees to be charged in connection with
judicial proceedings and then added the following:
[W]e cannot omit mentioning . . . another practice lately crept in amongst us
that of Buying and selling the Offices of the County Clerks and the very
persons who receive the Profits of the Offices of Clerks & Registers Practising
as Attorneys in the Courts to which these Offices belong[. T]hat such Sales
are unlawful is too obvious to be denied . . . .97

Similar complaints arose in North Carolina and Massachusetts, where the
people complained about governors who chose officials on the basis of
corrupt considerations (rather than merit) and then protected the officials in
question when the people complained about their incompetence.98
Governors naturally objected to any intrusion on their powers of
patronage. Historian Leonard Labaree recounts the story of one
Massachusetts governor who was saddened to learn that London had
appointed a naval officer for the province; the governor was forced to turn
his own son-in-law out of the office and deny his children “so much
bread.”99 But more than bread was at stake; governors felt that the
efficiency of the administration depended on their ability to insist that
subordinates do their jobs. Officeholders who held patents directly from
London, rather than through the colonial governor, felt no sense of

96

See LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH
COLONIAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1783, at 102–04 (1930). Occasionally, controversies arose over fee-paid
office and reliance on deputies to perform essential government functions. For example, one office
holder complained about his suspension from office on the ground that he had paid good money for the
position. See Letter from Samuel Johnston to North Carolina Governor Martin (Nov. 16, 1775), in
10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA: 1775–1776, at 332–33 (William L. Saunders ed.,
1890) (“[T]he Office which I have for some years past executed under the Deputation of Mr. Turner
was an honest purchase for which I have punctually paid an annual sum . . . .”).
97
40 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: 1737–1740, at 392–93 (Bernard Christian Steiner ed., 1921).
98
See CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 1 (1905) (recording the
complaint of John Adams that Governor Frances Hutchinson of Massachusetts had passed over proper
candidates in order to advance members of his own family); 2 RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 94, at 159 (criticizing the sale of offices “without any regard to the fitness of the persons to execute
them” and noting that the governor protects inferior officers and others who pay yearly pensions “in the
neglect and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and prosecutions against them are in vain”).
99
LABAREE, supra note 96, at 105.
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allegiance to, and little need to obey, the governor. Customs officials in
particular were notably reluctant to follow gubernatorial advice.100
One can see growing popular resentment of colonial patronage
practices in the provisions of the great state papers that attended the
movement to independence from Great Britain. For starters, the Declaration
of Independence included the following complaint against the King’s
patronage: “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither
swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.”101
Scholars agree that this vivid complaint attempts to convey popular
discontent with the Crown’s tendency to use offices as sinecures for the
benefit of “placemen.”102 Discontent with the corrupting influence of the
appointment power also shows up in the Articles of Confederation of the
newly independent states, which articulated an early version of the
Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause: Article V prohibited delegates to the
Continental Congress from “holding any office under the United States, for
which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument
of any kind.”103 Here one finds a reflection of two ideas: that office can
corrupt the exercise of independent legislative judgment and that the
corrupting influence of office can operate indirectly, by conferring valuable
fees and emoluments on family members or others beholden to the
delegate.
State constitutions addressed the problem of official corruption in the
appointment process through a variety of approaches. Some states
responded by relying on the popular election of state and local officials or
by placing the appointment power in the legislative branch of government,
thus depriving civil officers of the appointment power and any share of
patronage that the power had previously conferred. Georgia followed this
approach.104 Some states authorized the executive and judicial branches of
government to exercise some control over appointments but hemmed in
those appointment powers in various ways. For example, Pennsylvania
established an elected council to control the appointment of important
100

Id. at 105–06.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776).
102
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 212 (1998
ed.) (quoting William Henry Drayton speaking of the placemen as “strangers destitute of property and
natural alliance in the Colonies” who create laws for a country “in which they have no interest but their
commissions”); see also Pfander, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing colonial anger at officeholders who did
little work to justify the fees they collected). The highlighted passage from the Declaration may also
take issue with the Crown’s attempt to make the customs office more efficient by requiring the officials
to move to North America to perform their office, rather than assigning the obligations to a do-nothing
deputy.
103
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2.
104
See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIII (“All civil officers in each county shall be annually elected on
the day of the general election, except justices of the peace and registers of probates, who shall be
appointed by the house of assembly.”).
101
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officers.105 Some states were unwilling to rely entirely on the structure of
the appointment power to deal with corruption and abuse. In these states,
the constitution included provisions that barred the holding of multiple
offices and the receipt of fees and emoluments.106 These states were
working out a new conception of judicial office in which the judge would
receive a fixed or stated salary and would not be entitled to fees and
perquisites of office.107
Maryland’s constitution provides a good example of the shift from a
fee-paid office to one in which the salary was meant to provide full
compensation. After providing for the payment of salaries, “liberal, but not
profuse,” to the chancellor and other state judges, the Maryland
constitution provided that “[n]o Chancellor or Judge ought to hold any
other office civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”108
By barring fees and perquisites, the provision apparently clarifies that the
judges were not to receive fees from the litigants who appeared before
them or perquisites in any form. A similar provision appeared in the
Pennsylvania constitution, which provided fixed salaries for judges and
prohibited them from holding any other office or receiving “fees or
perquisites of any kind.”109 In both of these states, then, the judges were
entitled only to their salary and were barred from receiving other sources of
income from their office. Although the two constitutions do not so provide
in terms, they would apparently prohibit judges from selling any inferior
offices within their power; income of that sort would presumably qualify as
a prohibited perquisite of office.110
105

Under Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776, the executive included both a president and council.
The council was made up of twelve men elected by freemen, and members served one- to three-year
terms as opposed to the president’s annual election by the state’s assembly and the council. SCOTT
DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER 281–82 & n.67 (2011).
106
Article 10 of Connecticut’s 1818 Constitution explicitly prohibited judges from holding
multiple offices. See id. at 154. Similarly, under Article 35 of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776,
no “Judge of the Supreme Court of Law or Equity, or Judge of Admiralty” could hold an additional
office. Id. at 203. For a discussion of Maryland’s constitutional bar on fees and multiple office holding,
see infra notes 108, 110.
107
As a correspondent with those who framed the North Carolina Constitution, John Adams
expressed his adamant views that the judiciary “[s]hould not have their Minds distracted with
complicated jarring Interests . . . and . . . Salaries Should be fixed by Law.” See GERBER, supra note
105, at 202.
108
See MD. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 30.
109
See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 23 (“The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have
fixed salaries . . . ; they shall not be allowed . . . to hold any other office civil or military, nor to take or
receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”).
110
The apparent ban on judicial sale of inferior office in Maryland appears to be confirmed by the
restrictive nature of the provision that allows the “judges” of the superior courts to appoint their own
clerks. The provision begins with a rather open-ended grant of authority, allowing “the judges of the
general court and justices of the county courts” to “appoint the clerks of their respective courts.” But
this provision appears to contemplate that the appointments will occur during a regular session of the
court. During vacation, the period between regularly scheduled sessions of court, or removal of the
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As for the appointment of inferior judicial officers, a range of different
approaches prevailed, some of surprising intricacy. In Delaware, for
example, the appointment of the judges was vested in the president and
general assembly. But the appointment of a variety of inferior judicial
officers, including the registers in chancery, the clerks of the Court of
Common Pleas and orphans’ courts, and clerks of the peace, was vested in
the president and privy council.111 Meanwhile, the appointment of the clerk
of the supreme court was vested in the chief justice of that court and the
appointment of the recorders of deeds was vested in the “Justices” of the
Court of Common Pleas.112 At the same time, the Delaware constitution
appears to have ruled out patronage-based appointments to inferior judicial
office at least in part; it provided that the “Registers in Chancery and
Clerks shall not be Justices of either of the said courts of which they are
officers.”113
Of all the constitutional experiments with the allocation of
appointment power at the state level, perhaps the most significant occurred
in New York. There, John Jay, Gouverneur Morris, and Robert Livingston
collaborated in developing a provision that called for the creation of a
general purpose council of appointment made up of four senators, one from
each district, and the governor of the state.114 In addition to this general
purpose mechanism, the New York constitution specified a mode for the
appointment of court clerks and other judicial personnel:
[T]he register and clerks in chancery be appointed by the chancellor; the
clerks of the supreme court, by the judges of the said court; the clerk of the

officer out of state, “the governor with the advice of the council may appoint and commission a fit and
proper person to such vacant office respectively, to hold the same until the meeting of the next general
court or county court, as the case may be.” See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 47.
111
See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 12 (“The President and Privy Council shall appoint the Secretary,
the Attorney General, Registers for the probate of wills and granting letters of administration, Registers
in Chancery, Clerks of the Courts of Common Pleas and Orphans Courts, and Clerks of the
Peace . . . .”).
112
See id. art. 14 (“The Clerks of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Chief Justice
thereof, and the Recorders of Deeds, by the Justices of the Courts of Common Pleas for each county
severally . . . .”).
113
Id. art. 12.
114
See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIII (council, made up of four senators and the governor, given
power to nominate and, with advice and consent of the legislative council, appoint all officers other
than those with modes of appointment otherwise specified). For an account of the collaboration of Jay,
Morris, and Livingston, see 1 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 122–23 (Boston,
Gray & Bowen 1832), describing a meeting in Livingston’s rooms at which Jay presented a plan for the
council and secured the support of Morris and Livingston. See also Arthur Paul Kaufman, The
Constitutional Views of Gouverneur Morris 194–205 (June 30, 1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University) (recounting the development of the council and Jay’s subsequent letter to
Morris and Livingston). For an account of the subsequent history of the council of appointment, see
FISH, supra note 98, at 86–91 (describing the way politicians used the council as a mechanism for
patronage appointments, setting the stage for the spoils system).
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court of probates, by the judge of the said court; and the register and marshal
of the court of admiralty, by the judge of the admiralty.115

Jay objected to this provision and argued in a letter sent to Morris and
Livingston in the immediate aftermath of the New York constitution’s
adoption that the judges were not a proper recipient of the power to appoint
their own clerks. Taking a page from classic republican theory, Jay argued
that the judges “will be tempted not only to give these appointments to their
Children Brothers Relatives and Favorites, but to continue them in Office
against the public Good.”116 Among other things, Jay worried that the
judges would develop a “[p]artiality” to their appointees and would
combine with them to “conceal[] . . . or excuse[] their mutual Defects or
misdemeanours.”117 New York’s experience with vesting appointment
power in the judges may have informed later developments. Ten years
later, Gouverneur Morris was to draft the court-based appointment
provision of Article II and, as we shall see below, Jay himself was to
institute the practice of court-based appointments when he became the
nation’s first Chief Justice.
C. Framing the Courts of Law Provision in Article II
By the time of the framing, state experience with legislative control of
the appointment process had persuaded many Federalists of the wisdom of
115

N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII.
Letter from John Jay to Robert Livingston and Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 29, 1777), in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, pt. 2, at 683
n.1 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) [hereinafter DHSC]. Obviously, where courts employ but a single judge,
it may not matter a great deal whether the Constitution assigns the appointment power to the court or
the judge. Even with single-judge courts, however, a court-based mechanism may signal that the
appointment was to be a public act, taken in open court. As we shall see, Chief Justice Jay implemented
such a public-regarding approach to appointments early in his tenure. See infra notes 147–59 and
accompanying text.
117
1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116. The subsequent history of the office of clerk of the federal
district courts certainly appears to bear out Jay’s prediction. As described in Scott Messinger’s
intriguing history, federal court clerks came to behave just as the republican critics of fee-paid office
would have predicted. See I. SCOTT MESSINGER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ORDER IN THE COURTS: A
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURT CLERK’S OFFICE (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/ordcourt.pdf/$file/ordcourt.pdf. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Congress took a
series of steps to regulate the affairs of the clerk’s offices, fearing that their reliance on fees tended to
encourage graft and corruption. See id. at 26 (quoting President Millard Fillmore’s criticism of fee-paid
clerks as the cause of “vexation, injustice, and complaint”). One important reform was to establish a
uniform bill of fees in 1853, but problems continued. Id. at 27. Eventually, Congress installed oversight
through the Department of Justice, in 1870, but judges often acted to protect their clerks and their
entitlement to fees. In 1912, an investigation by the DOJ revealed clerical misconduct in some twentyeight districts, leading to a series of indictments and convictions. Id. at 41. Recounting their opposition
to reforms that would abolish the fee system and put clerks on salary, Justice Felix Frankfurter derided
the clerks as “placemen whose clerical jobs were threatened.” Id. at 40 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 133 (1928)).
116
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lodging responsibility in a single chief executive.118 Alexander Hamilton,
James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris, in particular, shared the view that a
multimember body was an inappropriate recipient of the appointment
power.119 During June discussions of the selection of federal judges, Wilson
opposed appointment by the legislature on the ground that “[i]ntrigue,
partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences.”120 James
Madison said much the same thing, echoing the concern with intrigue and
adding the point that members of the legislature were not good “judges of
the requisite qualifications.”121 Morris explained his similar view in a
criticism of the August 1787 Committee of Detail draft, which assigned the
appointment power to the Senate:
He considered the body as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to cabal;
and as devoid of responsibility.—If judges were to be tried by the Senate . . . it
was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its
own decrees were to create.122

Eventually, the Convention came part way around to the views of the
Federalists, adopting the now familiar provision for an appointment power
initiated by the President, who nominates and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoints judges and other high government
officials.123
Having solved the problem of appointment to high office, the
Convention addressed the question of how to appoint inferior officers.
Here, Morris played a leading role, proposing a provision that would
authorize Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers “in the
President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of Departments.”124
118

For the classic account of the movement away from legislative and toward executive
appointment, see WOOD, supra note 102, at 79, 143.
119
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Every
mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave in which cabal and intrigue will
have their full scope.”); see also JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1787), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS
105 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 1954) (describing the executive as capable of cautious and “responsible”
appointments, whereas a representative assembly is “accountable to nobody”).
120
See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records] (recording June 5, 1787 remarks of James Wilson).
121
Id. at 120 (remarks of Madison).
122
See 2 id. at 389 (recording Aug. 23, 1787 remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
123
The decisive vote on the appointments power came on September 7, 1787, after the Convention
had settled the mechanism by which the President was to be elected. See id. at 533. For a brief
restatement of the principles underlying the Appointments Clause, see JOSEPH STORY,
3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1524, at 376 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray
& Co. 1833) (offices in a republican government “not as a means of corrupt influence, or individual
profit; not for cringing favorites, or court sycophants; but for purposes of the highest public good; to
give dignity, strength, purity, and energy to the administration of the laws”).
124
2 Farrand’s Records, supra note 120, at 627 (recording Sept. 15, 1787 remarks of Gouverneur
Morris).
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Notably, the provision authorizes the assignment of appointment power to a
multimember body, the court, rather than to the judges or chief justices of
the courts. The provision thus differs both from the New York constitution
(which vested power in the judges of the several courts) and from the other
provisions in Article II that appear to call for individuals (the President or
the department heads) to exercise the appointment power.125 As we have
seen, Morris and his fellow Federalists generally opposed the assignment of
appointment power to multimember bodies, worrying about corruption,
intrigue, and concealment.126 The Convention’s choice of the courts as the
only (obvious) multimember body to which Congress can assign the
appointment power thus demands explanation.127
In seeking an explanation for the choice of the courts, we might begin
by observing the difference, in formal terms, between the work of courts
and the work of the judges who serve on those courts. Courts conducted
judicial business on the record, on days officially designated for the
conduct of such business, and the public was free to attend.128 Judges, by
contrast, were free to conduct business out of court, or in their chambers,
and often did so in connection with chores they viewed as ministerial. The
public, on-the-record quality of the actions of a court may have lessened
the concern with cabal and intrigue that otherwise arose when
125

Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010)
(concluding that the multimember Securities and Exchange Commission could be considered a
department “head” for purposes of the Appointments Clause).
126
See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. One might contend that a thoroughgoing
commitment to the elimination of patronage and the sale of office makes it hard to explain why Article
II empowers Congress to assign appointment power to such individuals as the heads of department and
the President, acting alone. A variety of explanations come to mind, including the possibility that the
move to salarization and a public-regarding conception of office came earlier to the judiciary than to the
Executive Branch. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
127
The Court has now concluded that another, less obvious, multimember body can exercise the
appointment power as a department “head.” See infra note 225. One might argue that the Convention
chose the courts as a generic placeholder in light of the fact that it was framing a constitution to govern
a judicial system that had not yet been established. But it would have surely been just as easy to draft a
placeholder reference to judges (“judges of the courts of law”) had that been the intention of the
Framers.
128
On the public quality of court days in colonial and early statehood America, see, for example,
A.G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom: The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater Virginia, 1720 to
1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 29 (1980). See also RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA,
1740–1790, at 90 (2d ed. 1999) (“In the monthly concourse at the courthouse the male part of Virginia
county society became visible to its members in a manner similar to that observed at the parish
church.”). On the distinction between the work of judges in chambers or during vacation, and the work
of courts, see Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Dec. 7, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note
116, at 682, regretting that the circuit courts cannot proceed for want of a seal, but observing that the
statute “enables the sup. Court, and not the Judges of it to provide one,” and concluding on that basis
that “no order on the Subject by the Judges out of Court, would be regular.” Cf. Draft Letter from the
Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 13, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 116, at
89–92 (1988) (criticizing the assignment of circuit-riding duties to the Justices of the Supreme Court on
the basis of the perceived difficulty of separating courts from the judges that serve them).
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multimember bodies made appointments. Courts of law would presumably
owe an obligation to make their appointments part of the public record,
thus exposing the judges to criticism if they were to make patronage-based
appointments that favored family members or other unqualified favorites.
The choice of the courts as the approved recipient of the appointment
power may thus reflect an attempt to clarify that the power of appointment
was to be a public trust, rather than a private source of personal patronage
or judicial emolument.
Judicial practice in the early republic frequently distinguished between
the judge or judges of the court and the court itself. Courts, under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, were to sit for periods of time specified in the Act,
often less than the full year. Thus, the Supreme Court was to sit as such in
February and August of each year, continuing until the business before the
Court was complete.129 During the remainder of the year, the Justices
dispersed to hold circuit courts throughout the country.130 Those courts, in
turn, were directed to meet at specified times and places. Questions might
arise as to what sort of relief a judge of the circuit or Supreme Court could
provide during “vacation,” the times when the court itself was not sitting.131
Vacation, and the distinction between court and judge, figured prominently
in Justice John Rutledge’s reaction to a petition asking the circuit court for
the district of North Carolina to remove an action brought by Robert Morris
from the courts of that state by writ of certiorari. According to a
contemporaneous letter from Morris’s attorney, Justice Rutledge thought
the requested relief ought to be granted on the merits but doubted his power
to act as a judge out of court.132 District judges were free to act for their
129

Early terms of Court lasted but a few days; the Court had no business to conduct other than the
ceremonial and formal business of admitting lawyers to practice before the Court. For an account, see
1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175, reporting the Court’s first sessions as devoted to admission of
counsel and other housekeeping work, and JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 663 (1971), observing that “it was
not until 1796 that a substantial amount of appellate business was ready for disposition.”
130
For an account of the burdens of circuit riding and the Justices’ efforts to secure legislative
relief, see Pfander, supra note 14, at 31–34.
131
The existence of vacations helps to explain why the Judiciary Act invested the judges
themselves with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, recognizing the time-sensitive nature of
inquiry into the legality of detention. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (providing,
in addition to the power of federal courts to grant habeas, “that either of the justices of the supreme
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment”); see also Pfander, supra note 25, at 1486–87
(observing that the limited terms of the early federal courts meant that federal judges were often riding
circuit and needed power to oversee the legality of detention as judges, rather than as courts).
132
See Letter from Richard Nichols Harison to Robert Morris (Sept. 24, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 116, at 95, 98 (1988) (stating that Judge Rutledge “made no Objection to the Propriety of removing
the Suit, or to granting the Injunction as far as the Merits of the Cause were concerned; but he was
unwilling solely to take upon him, during the Vacation the Office of directing the Measures which are
prayed by the Bill”). Similarly, when the invalid pension statute became controversial in the early
1790s, some Justices proposed to solve the problem by acting as commissioners out of court, although
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own account during vacation; indeed, some continued to act as lawyers in
state court proceedings until a federal statute forbade the practice.133
By making the court the appointing body, and countering the notion
that judges were to exercise the power for their own account, Article II
appears to have complemented other features of the Constitution that
worked an important change in the nature of judicial office. Article III
provides that the judges of both the Supreme and inferior courts are to
receive, at stated times, a compensation for their services that shall not be
diminished during their continuation in office.134 For a variety of reasons,
one can probably best interpret the provision as creating a regime of
presumptively salary-based compensation. Certainly the delegates who
debated the compensation provision at Philadelphia appear to have
assumed that it called for the payment of a salary and ruled out the receipt
of fees for judicial service.135 In addition, when Congress implemented the
Article III compensation provision, it did so by providing the judges with
an annual salary, to be paid on a quarterly basis.136 What’s more, when
Congress learned that a federal judge in South Carolina was collecting fees
in admiralty cases, it promptly enacted legislation to govern such cases that
ruled out the collection of judicial fees and thus curtailed the practice.137
Just as the early practice under Article III appears to confirm the doubts
some expressed about the propriety of fee-based judicial compensation,
early steps taken by Congress and the Supreme Court to implement Article
II similarly confirm that court-based appointments were aimed in part at
foreclosing the favoritism, bias, and possible self-dealing inherent in the
judicial appointment of inferior officers. To that evidence of early practice
this Article now turns.
D. Implementing Article II
Early legislation erecting courts of the United States and empowering
them to hire clerks, criers, and other personnel consistently assigned the
appointment power to the courts, rather than to the judges staffing them.
What’s more, Chief Justice Jay’s approach to the appointment of the first
questions arose about that solution. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 35–38; see also David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 640 (1996)
(noting that Congress fixed the invalid pension act by separating the judge from the court and assigning
the judge certain extrajudicial duties).
133
See Pfander, supra note 14, at 23 n.118 (describing the federal statute that forbade federal
judges from practicing law).
134
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
135
See supra text accompanying note 18.
136
See Pfander, supra note 14, at 24 & nn.122–23 (discussing the Compensation and Process Acts
of 1789); see also supra text accompanying note 20.
137
After the Act’s passage, Thomas Bee, the district court judge for the District of South Carolina,
acknowledged that the 1793 statute prohibited his practice of fee collection. See Pfander, supra note 14,
at 25–26 & nn.133–34.
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clerk of the Supreme Court, John Tucker, revealed that he took quite
seriously the difference between court-based and Chief-based
appointments. While the judges of many district courts were less
punctilious than Chief Justice Jay about preserving the formal distinction
between court-based and judge-based appointments,138 it was not until the
Court’s 1839 decision in Ex parte Hennen that district court judicial control
of the appointment and removal of clerks became an acknowledged part of
the legal framework of office.139
The story of legislative implementation begins with Section 7 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which specified the appointment of inferior judicial
officers in the following terms:
That the Supreme Court, and the district courts shall have power to appoint
clerks for their respective courts . . . and that the clerk for each district court
shall be clerk also of the circuit court in such district . . . .140

The provision appears to have been quite consciously modeled on the
language of Article II and seeks to vest the appointment power in the courts
themselves rather than in the judges. Elsewhere, the legislation provided
that the Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and five Associate
Justices.141 Clearly, Congress opted to place the appointment power in the
Court itself, rather than in the Chief.

138

Congress provided for but a single judge to staff each of the federal district courts, thus creating
an identity between court and judge that may have encouraged a sense of judicial entitlement. See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (establishing in each of thirteen districts a district court
“to consist of one judge”). Whatever the reason, some district “courts” appointed the judge’s family
members to serve as clerks. See, e.g., MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 2 (reporting that David Sewall,
district judge for the District of Maine, appointed his nephew Henry as clerk).
139
See 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839) (concluding that the district court judge had discretion to
remove the court clerk, not for cause, but to make room for the appointment of the judge’s friend).
Shortly after Hennen came down, Congress enacted a provision empowering the circuit court to hire its
own clerk and specifying that in cases of disagreement (between the district and circuit judge), the
presiding judge would have the appointment. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 2, 5 Stat. 321, 322
(“[A]ll the circuit courts of the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks . . . .”).
140
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73, 76. When Congress first conferred power on
the federal courts to name commissioners (an early precursor to magistrates), it vested the appointment
power in “any circuit court or either of the district courts of Maine or Kentucky” and thus continued the
early practice of court-based appointment. See Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 333, 334. See
generally Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner
System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1970) (describing the evolution from reliance on commissioners to
reliance on magistrates). To be sure, section 2 of the nation’s first bankruptcy statute empowered
district judges to appoint “commissioners” of the said bankrupt. See Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat.
19, 21–22. But it appears from the oath requirement in section 3 that such commissioners were to act
for the bankrupt during the pendency of the proceeding and not as inferior officers of the United States.
Id. § 3. The Act was repealed in 1803. See Act of December 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
141
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. at 73 (declaring that the Supreme Court shall
consist of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, and specifying that the Court’s sessions would
begin on the first Monday of February and August at the seat of government).
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Some might argue that the provision for appointing marshals
complicates the story of early implementation. Section 27 provides that a
“marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four
years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be
to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the
Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit.”142 The provision
fails to identify an appointing and removing superior and certainly does not
specify a court-based appointment mechanism. But neither does it
contemplate appointment by the district court judge. The phrasing of the
provision makes clear that marshals, although judicial servants in the sense
that they were duty-bound to execute the “lawful precepts” of the courts
they attended and perform other chores, were to be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. And so they were.143
As a consequence, the marshals’ office has long been viewed as a part of
the Executive Branch of government and now operates within the
Department of Justice.144 Far from disproving a consistent practice of
assigning judicial appointments to the court, rather than the judge, the
marshal provision actually confirms the drafters’ careful attention to
matters of form and structure.145 In any case, later legislation carried on the
pattern of vesting the power to appoint judicial officers in the courts.146
Chief Justice John Jay played a central role in implementing the
practice of court-based, rather than Chief-based, appointment of inferior
officers. In late 1789, shortly after it became generally known that he was
to become the Chief Justice, Jay was inundated with requests for patronage
appointments that proceeded on the assumption that he would make the
142

Id. § 27, 1 Stat. at 87. Deputy marshals were to be appointed by the marshal, subject to removal
from office “by the judge of the district court.” Id. Interestingly, then, the statute gives the President
removal power over the marshals and the district judge removal power over deputy marshals. Perhaps
the drafters sought to give the judge some leverage over deputies in case the marshal were to leave the
office in charge of a deputy that the judge deemed unfit to perform its duties. The choice of the judge as
the party with the removal power, rather than the court, suggests that the drafters did not view Article
II’s court-based appointment provision as a limit on the assignment of removal power.
143
The marshal was expected to serve as the federal analog to the state sheriff, serving writs and
precepts, handling court funds and federal prisoners, and overseeing the federal census operation in the
district. For an account of the early history of the marshal’s office, featuring a discussion of President
Washington’s appointments, see FREDERICK S. CALHOUN, THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES MARSHALS
AND THEIR DEPUTIES, 1789–1989 (1989), and David S. Turk, A Brief Primer on the History of the U.S.
Marshals Service, FED. LAW., Aug. 2008, at 26.
144
See 28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (2006) (“There is hereby established a United States Marshals Service as
a bureau within the Department of Justice . . . .”).
145
The decision to assign the power to appoint (and remove) marshals to the President may have
reflected the conclusion that the execution of judgments was a matter for the Executive Branch of
government.
146
See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 7, 1 Stat. 624, 626 (declaring the “respective courts of the
United States shall appoint criers for their courts, to be allowed the sum of two dollars per day”); see
also supra note 139 (quoting the provision in the Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, 5 Stat. 321, for the
circuit courts to appoint the court’s clerk).
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appointments himself (in keeping with the English model). For example, in
one such letter, Theodore Sedgwick (a member of the Massachusetts
congressional delegation) apologized for soliciting Chief Justice Jay on
behalf of a friend. But, Sedgwick explained, such applications must
frequently come “to men [like Chief Justice Jay] who have the power to
confer offices.”147 Fisher Ames made the same assumption, writing in
November 1789 to recommend an “eminently qualified” candidate “to your
favour and patronage.”148 Even fellow Justice William Cushing wrote Chief
Justice Jay to press the case of an applicant for the clerk position.149
Chief Justice Jay’s response to these supplications was remarkable; he
consistently rejected the notion that he had the power to make the
appointment himself and insisted that the decision would be taken by the
Court following consultation with the Justices in attendance. Consider his
reply to Fisher Ames:
There are at present several candidates for the place in question, and probably
the number will be increased before the appointment takes place. As it should
be the result of mutual information and joint consultation between the judges,
it appears to me proper that I should in the mean time remain free from
engagements, express or implied, to or for any gentleman, however well
recommended.150

Chief Justice Jay said much the same thing in his reply to Justice Cushing:
I have made it a Rule to keep myself free from Engagements, and at Liberty to
vote as after mutual Consultation among the Judges shall appear most
adviseable. . . . There are several matters which will demand early attention;
and it would doubtless be useful to have some informal meetings before
Court, in order to consider and mature such measures as will then become
indispensable.151

Chief Justice Jay’s sharpest remarks were directed to an acquaintance, John
DuMott, who had approached him for an office. Chief Justice Jay turned
down the request, explaining:
[O]n these occasions it is best to be very explicit. [I]t would neither be
friendly nor candid to excite delusory Expectations, or to make Promises
without a good Prospect of performing them. There is not a single office in my
Gift, nor do I recollect that there is more than one in the appointment of the
147

See Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to John Jay (Sept. 23, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note
116, at 665.
148
See Letter from Fisher Ames to John Jay (Nov. 10, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at
676.
149
See Letter from William Cushing to John Jay (Nov. 18, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note
116, at 678–79. Justice Cushing, Ames, and Sedgwick all supported the eventual appointee, John
Tucker.
150
Letter from John Jay to Fisher Ames (Nov. 27, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 680.
151
Letter from John Jay to William Cushing (Dec. 7, 1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at
682.
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Court . . . . [A]s to offices in the Gift of other Departments I think it my Duty
not to interfere . . . .152

In each instance, then, Chief Justice Jay rejected the assumption that offices
in the Judicial Branch were his to confer and apparently did so because the
Court was the appointing agency and was to decide the matter after “joint
consultation between the judges.”153
Looking to the official record of the actions taken by the Supreme
Court when it convened at the nation’s capital (New York City) in
February 1790, we find Chief Justice Jay was as good as his word.
Although there was little judicial business to do,154 the Court did manage to
appoint two inferior officers (a crier and a clerk) and began to admit
attorneys and counselors to practice before the bar of the Court. The
official minutes of the Court’s first two sessions include the following
entries:
Ordered, that Richard Wenman, be, and he is appointed Cryer of this
Court.155
Ordered, that John Tucker Esq. of Boston, be the Clerk of this Court. That
he reside, and keep his Office at the Seat of the National Government, and that
he do not practice either as an Attorney or a Counsellor in this Court while he
shall continue to be Clerk of the same.156

Although a matter of routine, these two appointments provide important
insights into the Court’s own understanding of its appointment power.
First, although the Justices had met in advance about the clerkship
appointment and settled on Tucker, they nonetheless viewed themselves as
duty bound to formalize the appointment by issuing an order in open court

152

See Letter from John Jay to John DuMont (Feb. 27, 1790), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at
696–97. Chief Justice Jay was slightly more forthcoming in a response to a request for office submitted
by his sister-in-law on behalf of her husband. See Letter from John Jay to Catharine Ridley (Nov. 11,
1789), in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note 116, at 677 (describing the position of clerk as unlikely to afford
Mr. Ridley “a [l]iving”).
153
Such a collegial approach to selection of officers would have the incidental effect of protecting
individual judges both from the burden of dealing with office seekers and from the obligation to explain
why favored candidates were rejected.
154
Although the Court failed to muster a quorum on the first Monday of the month, a fourth Justice
arrived and the Chief Justice proclaimed the Court open for business. Newspaper reports suggest that
the event was well attended by the leading statesmen of the day, many of whom were already in town as
members of Congress. 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 171 & n.2 (reproducing the official minutes of
the Court, which describe the absence of a quorum on February 1, 1790, and the need for deferral of
business to the next day); see also id. at 165 n.4 (describing the temporary appointment of McKesson as
clerk before Tucker was chosen to serve); id. pt. 2, at 686–87 (collecting newspaper coverage of the
Court’s initial failure to muster a quorum). The Court would not docket its first case for several sessions
and would not issue its first written opinion until 1792. See GOEBEL, supra note 129, at 554, 662–65.
155
Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175.
156
Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 3, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175.
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that would become a part of the official record.157 It was not enough simply
to send Tucker a letter of engagement or enter into a handshake agreement.
If the Court was to be the appointing agent, then the Court was obliged to
take action in accordance with the forms of law. The Justices’ decision to
make an official appointment by court order helps to explain why they took
no action the first day, when the absence of a quorum prevented the Court
as such from conducting official business.158 It also explains why the
Justices arranged to have a temporary clerk record the minutes of the
actions taken before the appointment of Tucker was formalized.159 By
preserving minutes, the Court would ensure that Tucker’s position would
be both formally lawful and part of the public record.
The Court’s appointment of the crier may be even more revealing. At
the time the Court acted, there was no statutory warrant for such an office.
It had not been created in the Judiciary Act, and the Process and
Compensation Acts similarly omitted any mention of the office.160 Indeed,
it was not until 1799 that Congress first authorized such a position,
declaring that each court of the United States shall appoint a crier and pay
two dollars a day for his services.161 That the 1790 appointment anticipated
the statute by nine years suggests that the Justices took the view that the
Court enjoyed inherent power to hire personnel viewed as necessary to the
conduct of judicial business.162 Apart from power to hire needed
employees, the appointment of the crier may shed additional light on the
Court’s understanding of the requirements of Article II. In appointing
Tucker as clerk, after all, one might understand the Court to have been
following the lead of the Judiciary Act, which defined the court as the
appointing agency. In the absence of a statutory directive, the Court’s
formal action in appointing the crier may more clearly reflect the Justices’
own view of the constitutional locus of the appointment power.
157

See Letter from John Jay to William Cushing, supra note 151.
Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 1790, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 171.
159
On the appointment of a temporary clerk, see 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 175 n.9, noting
that John McKesson acted as clerk on the first day the Court convened.
160
See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (declaring that in suits at common law, the
circuit and district courts were to follow the writs, modes of execution, and rates of fees of the state
courts in which they sat); cf. Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 72 (setting the salary of all federal
judges and the Attorney General of the United States but failing to address the payment to such judicial
officials as the clerk or the crier).
161
See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 7, 1 Stat. 624, 626.
162
For a careful assessment of inherent judicial authority, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of the Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001). Pushaw
does not address the inherent power of courts to hire personnel viewed as necessary to conduct judicial
business, although he does acknowledge as a general matter that courts can take action without
legislative authority that they find essential to carry out their judicial duties. See id. at 847–48; see also
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1677, 1681 (2004) (distinguishing between weak inherent power to act without congressional authority
and strong inherent power to act counter to congressional dictates).
158
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Whatever the crier’s significance for the debate over inherent powers,
the two appointments reveal a consistent commitment to a court-based
appointment process.163 The Court followed the practice of court-based
appointments for several years. Tucker resigned the clerk’s post after two
years, forcing the Court to find a replacement. The result of the search
appears in an order published on August 1, 1791:
Ordered, that Samuel Bayard be the Clerk of this Court in the place of John
Tucker Esquire of Boston resigned . . . .164

Bayard served for nine years, in part by appointing deputy clerks to
perform the office in his absence, and then resigned in 1800.165 Even
though Jay had long since left the bench and the Chief Justiceship, the
Court appointed Bayard’s successor by entering an order to that effect in
open court.166 Even today, the power to appoint the Court’s clerk, librarian,
reporter, and marshal remains in the Court, rather than the Chief Justice.167
Efforts to switch to a Chief-based approach have not taken hold, at
least with the Court’s own clerk and marshal. Following his installation as
Chief Justice in December 1864, Salmon Chase developed draft language

163

Chief Justice Jay’s correspondence reveals that he viewed the appointments as matters for the
court to settle through consultation and deliberation among the Justices. We cannot reconstruct the
nature of the deliberative process, but we do know that other candidates had been put forward, that
Tucker had strong support from Justice Cushing and from other leading figures in Massachusetts
politics, and that Tucker had served effectively as the clerk of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. We also know that Chief Justice Jay had advised Justice Cushing that candidates for the office
should plan to attend the Court’s first session in New York. Letter from John Jay to William Cushing
(Dec. 7, 1789), supra note 151. Tucker, accordingly, was present in the courtroom. Chief Justice Jay’s
correspondence does not reveal anything about the Court’s internal deliberations. But however
deferential he was to his colleagues in the selection of the clerk and crier, he was obviously quite
influential in shaping the way the Court approached the appointment process. Rather than a judge-based
appointment process, Chief Justice Jay ensured that the Court itself played the official role as the
appointing agency.
164
Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 1, 1791, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 192
(footnote omitted).
165
For an account of Bayard’s service as clerk and his reliance on deputy clerks, see 1 DHSC, pt.
1, supra note 116, at 162–63.
166
Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 15, 1800, in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note 116, at 330–31
(“Samuel Bayard Esquire having resigned the Office of Clerk of this Court. It is Ordered that Elias B.
Caldwell be appointed to the said Place . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Chief Justice Jay resigned in 1795 to
become governor of New York. In 1800, Oliver Ellsworth was presiding as Chief Justice; as a senator
from Connecticut, Ellsworth had played a lead role in drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789.
167
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671–674 (2006) (declaring that the Supreme Court may appoint officers to
serve as clerk, marshal, reporter, and librarian, and setting out the duties of such officials). Congress
first conferred power on the Court to appoint a reporter in 1817, vesting the appointment power in the
“Supreme Court.” See Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 376. Power to appoint a marshal was first
conferred on the Court in 1866. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, pt. 1, at 167 (1971) (describing the
adoption of the marshal provision).
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for inclusion in a bill to reorganize the federal judiciary.168 Among his
suggestions was one that provided: The “Chief Justice with the approval of
the Court may appoint a Marshal . . . .”169 When the issue came before the
Senate, the proponent of the language urged it as something the “judges”
had suggested.170 Senator Reverdy Johnson countered that he had never
heard from the “judges” any complaint about the existing practice of courtbased appointment.171 Others objected as well, and the provision was
rejected. In the leading historical account of the episode, Charles Fairman
recounts the court-based system that Chief Justice Chase had inherited and
explains he proposed a switch to a Chief-based system because he “had his
own man in mind” for a bit of “patronage.”172 The Senate’s rejection of a
switch thus represents a modest vindication of the constitutional principle
that the appointments were to be the product of a consultative process with
all of the Justices in an effort to end the patronage-based appointment
practices of the past.
E. The Drift to a Chief-Based Appointment Process
However consistent the early Court’s practice in making court-based
appointments of inferior judicial officers, such a practice did not
necessarily prevent district court judges from treating clerkship
appointments as a source of patronage. In an engaging history of the office
of the district court clerk, Scott Messinger reveals that the first clerk
appointed in the District of Maine was the nephew of the presiding judge.173
Messinger also tells the story of Ex parte Hennen, litigation that grew out
168

Chase was confirmed as Chief Justice and took his seat in December 1864 as the Civil War was
winding down, filling the post vacated by Chief Justice Roger Taney’s death. With him on the bench
were a number of Justices appointed by Lincoln’s predecessors (Justice Wayne, from Georgia; Justice
Catron, from Tennessee; Justice Nelson, from New York; Justice Grier, from Pennsylvania; and Justice
Clifford, from Maine). In addition, Chief Justice Chase had four Republican colleagues who had, like
him, been named to the bench by Lincoln (Justice Swayne, Ohio; Justice Miller, Iowa; Justice Davis,
Illinois; and Justice Field, California). For an account, see FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 1–4.
169
See id. at 167 (quoting language of section 2 of the Chief Justice Chase draft).
170
Id. at 168–69.
171
Id. at 169.
172
Id. at 167, 171; see also JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 410 (1995)
(confirming that Chief Justice Chase wanted to secure the position for his close friend and associate
Richard Parsons).
173
See MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 15 (noting that Henry Sewall, nephew of district court judge
David Sewall, was appointed as the first clerk of the District of Maine and describing other patronagebased appointments in the nineteenth century culminating in an Act of Congress that forbade nepotism).
Messinger reports that the early clerks were paid out of the fees they collected from litigants, thereby
producing some of the same problems with fee-paid office and corruption that the Framers had
elsewhere attempted to avoid. See id. at 8–12, 20 (describing the fee system and the discovery in 1818
that the district clerk in New York had embezzled over $100,000, apparently with the connivance of the
appointing judge). Eventually, in 1919, Congress placed the clerks on salary. Id. at 44–45. For a survey
of early compensation practices, see THOMAS K. URDAHL, THE FEE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
122–33 (Madison, Wis., Democrat Printing Co. 1898).
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of the decision of a newly appointed district judge in Louisiana to replace
the incumbent clerk with a friend.174 In making the appointment, the district
judge admitted that he was acting, not out of concern with Hennen’s
abilities, but out of “feelings of kindness” for Winthrop, the new
appointee.175 Although the former clerk sought a mandamus to compel his
continuation in office, at least as a circuit court clerk, the Court refused to
issue the writ. The Court confirmed that the clerk was one of the inferior
officers contemplated by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
properly subject to appointment by the courts of law.176 But in the absence
of any statutory guidance, the Court simply presumed that clerks were
removable at the will of the district court and could claim no vested right in
the office.177
The judicial practice approved in Hennen, which reflects a close
identification of the district judge with the district court over which he
presided, may help to explain how judges rather than courts came to be
seen as the appointing authority for inferior judicial officers. Another factor
in the evolution away from a court-based appointment process may have
been the need to empower an official to act with reasonable dispatch in
performing certain administrative chores when the courts were unable to
convene as such. In 1850, Congress adopted legislation to staff the district
courts when, by virtue of illness or disability, the incumbent district judge
was unable to do so. The mode chosen was to allow either the circuit judge
for the relevant circuit or the Chief Justice to “designate and appoint” a
district judge from an adjoining district to serve in the disabled judge’s
place.178 A short time later, Congress broadened the authority of the circuit
174

See 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). At the time, the Judiciary Act provided that the clerk of the
district court was to be selected by that court and was also to serve as the clerk of the circuit court. See
supra text accompanying note 140. The circuit judge preferred Hennen, the old clerk, and had blocked
the new clerk, Winthrop, from taking up circuit clerk duties. The Court’s rejection of the mandamus
petition left the district court in charge of choosing and removing the clerk for both courts. Congress
addressed the potential conflict by statute a short time later, vesting power in the circuit court to appoint
its own clerk. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 2, 5 Stat. 321, 322 (declaring that all “circuit courts of
the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks” and further providing in case of a
division among the judges that the presiding judge shall make the selection).
175
MESSINGER, supra note 117, at 17 (describing Judge Lawrence’s decision to replace Hennen
with Winthrop).
176
See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 258.
177
See id. at 259.
178
See Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442 (amended 1852) (authorizing circuit judge or Chief
Justice to “designate and appoint” a district judge from the same or an adjoining circuit to serve in the
place of the disabled judge). An earlier statute had conferred a similar form of designation authority on
circuit “court[s].” See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 25, 2 Stat. 89, 97 (repealed 1802) (authorizing
circuit court, in case of district judge’s disability, to assign a circuit judge to perform the duties of the
district judge during the continuance of the disability). In a still later attempt to address the disabilities
of district judges, Congress authorized the circuit court or its circuit justice to issue a writ of certiorari,
removing actions from the docket of the district court to that of the circuit court for resolution there. See
Act of March 2, 1809, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 534. Notably, to the extent the 1801 legislation called for an
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judge and Chief Justice to allow them to designate adjoining district judges
to address the “accumulation or urgency of judicial business in any
district.”179 At the time of the enactment, the Court’s term ran from the first
Monday in December 1851 to May 27, 1852.180 That left a substantial
period of time when the Justices of the Supreme Court were riding circuit
and unable to convene as a Court to make an official designation.181
Another decisive step was taken towards a Chief-based process during
Reconstruction as part of the Republicans’ desire to ensure the patronagebased appointments of Republican office seekers. Thus, in the midst of
Reconstruction debates in early 1867, Congress found time to adopt a new
bankruptcy law that included a provision that called for the Chief to play a
special role in the appointment of the bankruptcy registers to assist the
district courts. The provision reads as follows:
That it shall be the duty of the judges of the district courts . . . to appoint in
each Congressional district . . . , upon the nomination and recommendation of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, one or more
registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the district court . . . .182

According to a leading account, Congress consulted with Chief Justice
Chase before adopting the provision and he failed to object, perhaps due in
part to his interest in controlling the patronage and in part to his desire to
maintain good relations with the Republican members of Congress.183 But
Chief Justice Chase was flooded with petitions and delayed taking action in
his new executive capacity while he sought out the views of his brethren on
the constitutionality of his new role.184 Eventually, he agreed to perform the
function, adopting something of a straddle: he would act, not as the
appointing official, but would make nominations to the district judge on

appointment, it placed the power in the circuit court. The 1809 legislation did not make an appointment,
but simply treated disability as the trigger for removal.
179
See Act of April 2, 1852, ch. 20, 10 Stat. 5.
180
See CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 284 (1974) (as there were no statutory designations for term length or date,
the Court took it upon itself to lengthen its term in an effort to cope with its growing docket).
181
Prior to the 1850 and 1852 enactments, an 1848 legislative proposal to relieve the Justices of all
circuit responsibilities for a one-year period was rejected by the Senate. The Acts of 1850, 9 Stat. 442,
and 1852, 10 Stat. 5, served as a “[p]iecemeal attempt[]” to maintain the circuit riding system while
mollifying the overworked Justices, see SWISHER, supra note 180, at 282–84 & n.27.
182
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, 518, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
160, 20 Stat. 99.
183
See FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 355–65 (recounting the episode and the consultation with
Chief Justice Chase and criticizing him for having failed to resist the imposition of the appointive role).
184
In a letter to his Republican colleague, Justice Miller, Chief Justice Chase expressed a
willingness to perform the duty, onerous as it was, so long as it was “not unconstitutional.” Id. at 357.
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which that judge was expected to exercise an uncertain degree of
independent judgment.185
Apparently, it was this straddle that persuaded both Chief Justice
Chase and Congress that the Chief’s role was consistent with the
constitutional requirement of a Court-based appointment. Indeed, Senator
Roscoe Conkling defended the provision as one that the House “very
carefully” considered and had upheld on the ground that it entailed only
nomination by the Chief rather than appointment.186 It was true, as a formal
matter, that the appointment was to be made by the district judge. But
members of the Senate still raised questions. Senator Reverdy Johnson
expressed the following constitutional doubts:
The Constitution provides . . . that Congress may . . . vest the appointment
[of inferior officers] in a head of a Department or in a court. There is no
authority to vest it in any individual member of a court; but this clause, so far
from vesting the appointment in the [district] courts . . . , gives them merely a
negative upon the nomination of the Chief Justice.187

Others expressed practical concerns; how was the Chief to learn the
qualifications and reputation of local office seekers?188 Thus, when Chief
Justice Chase initially declined to make any nominations, members of the
Senate unsuccessfully moved to repeal the provision in part on
constitutional grounds.
Whatever one’s view of the formal distinction between Chief Justice
Chase as a nominating official and the district court as the appointing
entity, it appears quite evident that Republicans designed the provision to
ensure patronage-based appointments. Chase was a newly appointed
Republican Justice, and known to harbor presidential aspirations.189 Both of
the alternatives—the Court, with several holdover Justices from previous

185

Thus, in correspondence with the district judges, Chief Justice Chase described the action of the
district judge as “wholly independent of mine.” Id. at 365 n.211. He also dissented from the doctrine
that the district judges are “at all bound by the nomination of the Chief Justice.” Id. But he also advised
one recalcitrant district judge to reconsider his decision to reject two of his nominees. Id.
186
Id. at 359.
187
Id. at 358 (alterations in original) (quoting Sen. Reverdy Johnson). A Democrat from Maryland,
Senator Johnson was among Congress’s most knowledgeable students of the Constitution. See HAROLD
M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
1835–1875, at 313 (1982). His dim view of Reconstruction was informed both by his national political
ambitions and his perception that it threatened to “subject the white man to the absolute and
unconditional dominion of an armed force of a colored race.” ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
1866–1876, at 52 (Fordham Univ. Press 2005) (1985).
188
FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 356 (quoting Sen. Thomas Hendricks of Indiana).
189
Eventually, Chase did stand for the presidency, allowing his daughter Kate to manage his
unsuccessful candidacy for the presidential nomination of the Democratic (!) party. See NIVEN, supra
note 172, at 428–32.
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administrations,190 and the district courts—were conceivably less well
disposed to Republican office seekers.191 Assignment of a controlling role
in the process to the Chief could help to ensure the appointment of loyal
Republican bankruptcy registers in a way that a more decentralized or
court-based process might not. A major supporter of the legislation, Roscoe
Conkling, thus imagined that the Chief-based system would ensure a role
for the party; the Chief would not necessarily choose registers himself but
could simply rely on the House and Senate delegations from the relevant
district to identify the designee, thus transferring the value of the
appointment to the local party apparatus.192
Although the Chief’s nominating power did not survive the repeal of
the bankruptcy law,193 the Chief’s designation power took hold. Thus, the
early designation statutes from the 1850s provided a precedent on which
Congress could rely in creating the Commerce Court in 1910.194 With
President Taft in the White House, pressing for the bill, Congress adopted
legislation that created a special court to test the legality and enforce the
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The law provided for the
appointment of five Article III judges to staggered five-year terms. Upon
the conclusion of their Commerce terms, the judges were to serve on
regional circuit courts to which they were also appointed.195 The
controversy arose from a provision that called upon the Chief to appoint
successor judges from other Article III courts to serve when the initial fiveyear terms ended.196 Members of Congress criticized this vesting of

190

See supra note 168 (describing the ten-Justice Court of the day as including five Justices
appointed by previous administrations and five appointed by Lincoln).
191
See FAIRMAN, supra note 167, at 355–56 (quoting Sen. Fessenden for the proposition that
members of Congress supported the assignment of the appointment power to whatever judge or court
best aligned with “their way of thinking”). But as Fairman cogently observes, it makes little difference
which court actually makes the formal appointment if the Chief has control of the nomination process.
Id. at 356.
192
One defender of the legislation matter-of-factly assumed that the Chief would simply follow the
recommendations of the congressional delegation in making his nominations. See id. at 360 (quoting the
comment of Sen. Conkling).
193
The Act of 1867 was repealed in 1878; the next bankruptcy act, adopted in 1898, did not
contain the same appointment mechanism but instead assigned the power to appoint referees in
bankruptcy to the district courts they served. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 544, 555.
For an account, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States,
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 25 (1995).
194
See Mann–Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. For an account of the Commerce Court,
describing its three-year history and its disbandment by a disgruntled Congress, see George E. Dix, The
Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964),
and Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 965–67 (2011).
195
See 36 Stat. at 540.
196
See id.
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appointment authority in a single person and argued that the Court should
make the appointment instead.197
While Congress later disbanded the Commerce Court, the role of the
Chief in designating current Article III judges to serve on specialty courts
has remained very much alive. As Professor Ruger tells the story, Congress
has created a series of special tribunals and directed the Chief to staff them
with judges drawn from the ranks of current federal judges. These tribunals
include the Emergency Court of Appeals (1942–1961), which heard
appeals from the federal agency charged with setting prices during World
War II; the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (1968–present), which
entertains motions to transfer related cases for consolidated pretrial
proceedings before a single district court; the Special Division of the D.C.
Circuit (1978–2000), which appointed independent counsels and defined
the scope of their investigative authority under the terms of the Ethics in
Government Act; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
Court of Review (1978–present), which reviews Justice Department
applications for national security investigative warrants.198 As Professor
Ruger aptly notes, Congress has apparently come to regard Taft’s oncecontroversial model of Chief designation as “relatively unexceptional.”199
In the next Part, this Article will evaluate the constitutionality of Chiefbased appointments.
III. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHIEF-BASED APPOINTMENTS
As we have seen, scholars who have examined the question believe
that the Chief’s appointment powers pass constitutional muster. For these
scholars, two factors—the long history of Chief-centered appointments and
the perception that the Chief acts for the Court in making appointments—
cast doubt on the claim that Article II requires the Court to act.200 In this
Part, I first set out the elements of the affirmative case for a Court-based
appointment requirement. The second section of this Part explores various
elements of the defense of the Chief’s role. The third section offers a few
preliminary thoughts about how the Congress and the Supreme Court could
collaborate on a court-based appointment system with relatively modest
dislocation to current practice.
This Article does not advance any particular claim about the theory of
constitutional interpretation. Rather, drawing on the interpretive modalities
of Professor Bobbitt,201 the Article relies on evidence from the text,
197

See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 361 (quoting Sens. Robert LaFollette and
Thomas Gore).
198
Id. at 362–67.
199
Id. at 367.
200
See id. at 374 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991)).
201
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–119 (1982)
(elaborating six modalities of constitutional argument, including arguments from text, structure, history,
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structure, and history of Article II, all of which point in much the same
direction. Indeed, the historical evidence tends to confirm that the Framers
of Article II were right to fear patronage in creating a court-based
appointment process. Rather than selling offices for their personal account,
the judges who have accepted a role in the appointment process have
chosen patronage of a different stripe. Just as the district judge in Louisiana
replaced his court’s clerk, Mr. Hennen, with a personal friend, so too did
Chief Justice Chase accept a congressionally conferred role in the
appointment process in part to help advance a partisan agenda. Critics of
the Chief’s role in subsequent years have worried, with varying degrees of
candor, that political considerations might inform the Chief’s selections.
The clarity of the text, coupled with the continuing relevance of the
discipline such a process would impose, provide the basis for a strong
argument in favor of a return to a court-based approach to the appointment
of inferior judicial officers.
A. Advancing a Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis
The formal case in favor of restricting the power of Congress to invest
the Chief with power to appoint inferior officers in the Judicial Branch
flows directly from the language of Article II. It provides that Congress can
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President, in the heads of
departments, or in the courts of law. Because the Chief Justice is none of
these, one might argue that Congress cannot constitutionally vest the Chief
with appointment powers. Such an account gains strength from the
considerations that emerged in Part II. As the history explored there
reveals, the Framers had reason to distinguish the Court from the Chief in
thinking about how to structure a public-regarding appointment process.
Moreover, the early practice of Congress and the Supreme Court appears to
have respected the Court’s appointing role. The case for a Court-centered
appointment practice thus finds support in the text, in the early institutional
practice, and in a functional account of the appointment process as a public
trust.
The legislative precedents that led away from a Court-centered
appointment process help to underscore the wisdom of placing the power in
the courts of law, rather than the judges that staff them. To be sure, the
motives that underlay the provision for Chief-based nomination of
bankruptcy registers differed in important respects from the patronage
concerns that animated the Framers of Article II. In the eighteenth century,
precedent, prudence, and ethos); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29–89 (2000) (setting out the elements of a “documentarian” approach to
constitutional interpretation that nonetheless leaves considerable room for arguments based on history,
structure, and precedent); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750 n.9 (1999)
(developing a distinctive brand of text-centered interpretation but nonetheless celebrating Bobbitt’s
interpretive modalities as a “brilliant” contribution to the field).
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the Framers focused on the power of chief judges to line their own pockets
through the sale of offices to underlings. Such sales tended to result in the
multiplication of offices and an increase in the fees associated with
litigation. By the nineteenth century, patronage under the spoils system
provided the political parties with a way to reward loyal supporters with the
financial security of an office. Less well known, patronage also provided
the party with a source of funds to spend in the electoral process. Party
loyalists who landed jobs through the spoils system were expected to work
for the party and to pay over a portion of their salary to help underwrite the
party machine.202 The choice of Chief Justice Chase to nominate
bankruptcy referees thus helped to ensure a new set of officers from which
the Republicans could demand political support and payola. While Chief
Justice Chase was not selling the office of bankruptcy register for his own
account, his role surely enabled the Republican Party to extend its control
over the offices for patronage purposes. A court-based appointment
process, either lodged in the Supreme Court or in the district courts, would
have been far less subject to single-party capture.
Court-centered appointments also make sense in light of the
hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary and the vesting of the judicial
power in courts rather than judges. Unlike Article II, which vests executive
power in an individual (the President), Article III vests the judicial power
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may ordain
and establish.203 (No power is vested in the Chief Justice, other than that to
preside in the Senate over impeachment trials of the President.) Apart from
the vesting of power in the Court, Article III imposes requirements of
unity, supremacy, and inferiority that place the Supreme Court alone atop a
judicial pyramid, with a wide variety of inferior courts and tribunals at the
base.204 Recent scholarship suggests that such inferior courts and tribunals
owe a duty of obedience to the Court’s precedents and must remain subject
to the Court’s oversight and control.205 Although it operates as a
202

See generally RONALD J. HREBENAR ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (1999) (highlighting the importance of patronage in maintaining loyal party
workers and in filling party coffers); A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1992) (same). For an intriguing suggestion that patronage was
relatively benign, reflecting a modest level of corruption, and played a crucial role in building the
nascent American party system, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 66–69 (1968), arguing that patronage played a valuable role in stabilizing American
democracy.
203
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
204
See generally PFANDER, supra note 22 (Supreme Court must retain the power to oversee and
control all inferior courts and tribunals).
205
It was precisely this pyramidal conception of the Article III judiciary that the Scottish-born
jurist James Wilson put forward in his 1791 lectures on the structure of the federal judiciary. Recent
scholarship, moreover, reveals that the Scottish judicial system on which Wilson may have relied in
drafting Article III featured the elements of supremacy and inferiority that were included in the
Constitution. Thus, the Scottish Court of Session was proclaimed the supreme court and all other
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multimember body, the Supreme Court resembles the President in being
constitutionally installed as the head of one branch of the federal
government.
The provision for appointment of inferior officers by the courts of law
complements this hierarchical structure by authorizing Congress to vest the
appointment power in the courts, both Supreme and inferior, in which
Article III vests the judicial power. Such a provision maintains the Article
III hierarchy; the Supreme Court can make appointments of inferior
officers and the lower courts can make similar appointments. The Court’s
decision in Ex parte Hennen suggests that, at least in the absence of a
contrary statutory prescription, such officers will be subject to removal at
the appointing court’s will, thereby ensuring that they remain responsive to
their appointing tribunal. While the Supreme Court cannot necessarily
discharge officers appointed by the lower courts, it can oversee the work of
those courts to ensure that they properly play their judicial role. The choice
of the courts as the recipient of the appointment power thus ensures that the
Court, declared supreme in Article III, will retain its role at the top of the
judicial hierarchy and will be in a position to oversee the work of any
inferior officers it appoints.
One can imagine at least three ways to defend the Chief as the
depository of the appointment power. First, one might argue that Freytag
treats the Chief and the Court as equivalent for purposes of the appointment
power. Second, one might view the judicial bureaucracy as a separate
department, with the Chief Justice serving as its head. Third, one might
question whether at least some of the Chief’s appointees should be
regarded as inferior officers within the meaning of Article II. The next
section explores these issues.
B. Testing the Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis
Scholars defend the appointment role of the Chief Justice as one that
enjoys the support of a lengthy pedigree, dating at least from the
Progressive Era. But scholars advancing such an argument have thus far
failed to take account of early practice. We have seen that the Framers of
the Constitution likely provided for assignment of appointment powers to
the Court, rather than the Chief, to ensure a more transparent, publicly
accountable appointment process and to clarify that offices within the
judicial bureaucracy were not for sale.206 Chief Justice Jay took pains to
honor the spirit of Article II by ensuring that the appointments of inferior
officers were made in open court.207 Today, by contrast, the power to
tribunals were required to remain subordinate to the Session and to comply with its decisions. See
Pfander & Birk, supra note 22, at 1674–77. Wilson served on the Committee of Detail and played a
central role in the drafting of Article III. See id. at 1673.
206
See supra Part II.C–D.
207
See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
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appoint such officers as the director of the Administrative Office has been
statutorily assigned to the Chief Justice alone.208 The Court has no role to
play, either in the appointment or removal decision. As a practical matter,
then, it seems quite difficult to characterize the appointment practice as one
in which the Chief acts for the Court in making appointments.
Nor does Freytag v. Commissioner support an argument that the Chief
Justice should be deemed to act for the Supreme Court in making
appointments.209 To be sure, the statute in Freytag authorized the chief
judge of the Tax Court to appoint special judges, and the Supreme Court
upheld the statute after concluding that the Tax Court qualified as a court of
law within the meaning of Article II. The conclusion has helped to
persuade scholars to equate the appointment power of a court with that of
its chief judge. But during oral argument in Freytag, the Court was told that
the chief judge of the Tax Court was selected for the position by the other
judges of the Tax Court acting in their collective capacity.210 As a result, the
Court decided Freytag on the assumption that the chief judge had been
chosen by the court itself. While one can plausibly read Freytag to uphold
the chief judge’s power to act as the court’s designee in appointing special
judges, such a model differs in important respects from that which obtains
at the Supreme Court. Appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the Chief does not owe his position as such to the
Court.211 The Chief acts neither as the Court’s agent nor pursuant to the

208

See 28 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (defining the powers of the AO’s director and providing that the
director shall be “appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the United States, after
consulting with the Judicial Conference”).
209
See 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
210
During oral argument, one Justice inquired about the manner in which the chief judge of the
Tax Court was selected. Appearing for the Government, Deputy Solicitor General (and now Chief
Justice) John Roberts explained that the “chief judge is elected by the regular judges” of the court. But
that presented a problem; the Government had taken the position in its brief that the appointment in
question should be upheld by treating the chief judge as the “head of a department” of the Executive
Branch. But heads of departments must, according to the theory that animated the Government’s brief,
be appointed by and answer to the President, rather than to the members of a collegial body. The chief
judge was not a presidentially selected head, but as Roberts acknowledged, was more like the “head of a
collegial body” or “a chairman.” Oral Argument at 57:29, Freytag, 501 U.S. 868 (No. 90-762),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_762. That may explain why the
Court was persuaded to treat the Tax Court as a court of law, as suggested in the amicus brief of Erwin
Griswold. Justice Scalia’s solution, rejected by the majority but later embraced in Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, was to limit the courts of law to Article III courts and to regard the
multimember Tax Court itself as a department head. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 (2010) (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part)).
211
Scholars have argued that the Constitution does not require that the President choose the Chief
Justice and have suggested alternative selection modes, including election by the members of the Court
or rotation in office. See Todd E. Pettys, Choosing a Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative or a Job
for the Court?, 22 J.L. & POL. 231 (2006).

1167

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Court’s oversight in performing the appointment duties assigned to him by
statute.212
Apart from providing little support for current appointment practices
of the Chief Justice, Freytag may itself have been decisively reshaped by
the Court’s later decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board.213 In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court specifically adopted
the view (advanced by Justice Scalia in his separate Freytag opinion) that a
multimember commission could be regarded as a department head for
purposes of being empowered to appoint inferior officers within the
meaning of Article II.214 The Court also maintained that the SEC’s
Chairman could be regarded as acting for the Commission in making
appointments.215 The Court based this conclusion not on a presumed
identity between the Chairman and the Commission but on the nature of the
Commission’s oversight and control of the actions of its Chairman. The
Free Enterprise Court thus suggests that the practical quality of the
multimember body’s oversight, rather than a dogmatic presumption of
identity, will control the evaluation of when an officer acts for a board or
commission in making an appointment. The Court lacks any comparable
power over the Chief’s appointments.
As an alternative to depicting the Chief as acting for the Court, one
might defend the Chief’s role by characterizing him as the head of a
department. Congress has occasionally set up new institutions and housed
them within the Judicial Branch even though they do not exercise the
judicial power of the United States and play no direct role in the
adjudication of cases and controversies. Both the AO and the FJC play
supportive roles in the administration of justice and both lack any direct
adjudicative role.216 (Similarly, the U.S. Sentencing Commission operates
within Article III in performing the quasi-legislative task of fashioning
sentencing guidelines and does so without direct oversight by the Supreme
Court.) One might depict such agencies as comprising a department of
judicial administration over which Congress has installed the Chief as head.
One might defend the Chief’s appointment powers by drawing a distinction
212

Some scholars have suggested that Congress could alter the mode of the Chief’s selection,
proposing either a rotation based on seniority or a selection by the Court. See Edward T. Swaine, Hail,
No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 (2006) (suggesting alternative modes for
choosing the Chief Justice). Obviously, in the wake of such a reconfiguration, the Chief Justice might
be seen more as the Court’s designee than as an independent actor.
213
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
214
See id. at 3164 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring in part)).
215
So long as the Chairman made the appointments subject to the Commission’s oversight, the
Court agreed to treat the appointments as having been made by the Commission as the head of a
department. See id. at 3163 n.13 (upholding the Chairman’s appointments on the ground that they were
made “subject to the approval of the Commission” (quoting Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950,
§ 1(b)(2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 568 (2006))).
216
See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
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between his judicial role (acting as a member of the Supreme Court) and
his administrative responsibilities.217 Congress has often assigned
extrajudicial duties to the Chief; heading the judicial administration
department could be regarded as such a duty.
Yet the depiction of the Chief as the head of a separate department of
judicial administration runs into two related difficulties. For starters, as
Professor Resnik’s scholarship shows, the Chief may have difficulty in
maintaining clean lines of separation between the two roles.218 In a broader
sense, one cannot easily separate the work done by the Article III
bureaucracy from the fundamental judicial chore of resolving litigated
disputes. Just as the AO lobbies Congress for new courthouses, new
judgeships, and new support personnel,219 so too does the FJC provide
educational and statistical support to federal judges. The close connection
of all this work to the judicial function raises doubts about whether one can
really maintain a sharp distinction between what judges do and what their
supporting administrators do. In the end, everyone in the Third Branch
works to advance the administration of justice.
Second, structural constitutional considerations cast doubt on
Congress’s ability to create a department of judicial administration and
place the Chief Justice at its head. Recent decisional law and scholarship
tend to decry the prospect of a “headless ‘fourth branch’” of government,220
suggesting that any department of judicial bureaucracy should be regarded
as housed within one of the three traditional branches. For reasons that
Professor Resnik articulates, one has difficulty in seeing how the work of
judicial administration could be regarded as an element of either the
Legislative or Executive Branches of government (here, we should
distinguish the executive work of the marshal’s office from the work of
judicial support and administration).221 But even if one were to imagine a
217

See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 345 n.12 (referencing a thorough collection of
scholarly work regarding the Chief’s administrative duties).
218
See supra text accompanying notes 52–55.
219
In 2011, AO Director James C. Duff and Judge Julia Gibbons, Judicial Conference Budget
Committee chair, testified in front of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services
and General Government in support of the judiciary’s budget request of $7.3 billion. In addition to his
prepared testimony, Director Duff commented: “The one area where we could use additional help is in
judgeships, particularly in areas of the country that are very overworked.” See Judiciary Warns of
Impact of Deep Cuts in 2012, THIRD BRANCH (Apr. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/
TheThirdBranch/11-04-01/Judiciary_Warns_of_Impact_of_Deep_Cuts_in_2012.aspx. For a general
introduction to the AO, see supra note 3.
220
See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525–26 (2009) (opinion of Scalia,
J.) (describing “the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the headless Fourth Branch”). On the
origins of the term, during FDR’s Administration, see PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., 74TH
CONG., REP. OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 40 (Comm. Print 1937).
221
To be sure, the marshal’s service has long been housed in the Executive Branch, indicating that
nothing prevents Congress from making officers involved in the execution of judicial decrees
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department of judicial administration within the Executive Branch, it’s far
from clear that Congress could place the Chief Justice at its head. Such a
role would not conform to the hierarchical conception of the Executive
Branch that animates the Court’s recent decisions.
One finds a clear expression of these values of hierarchy and the chain
of command in the Court’s most recent application of the Appointments
Clause of Article II, Free Enterprise Fund.222 There, the Court invalidated a
provision of Sarbanes–Oxley, which had doubly insulated members of the
newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board from
presidential oversight and removal from office.223 More importantly for our
purposes, Free Enterprise Fund teaches important lessons about the
appointment implications of a hierarchical branch. On the Court’s view, the
President’s executive supremacy demands that he retain a measure of
control over government officers and thus invalidates restrictions that
insulate such officers from removal. Such invalidation was said to preserve
what Madison described as the proper “chain of dependence,” through
which “the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend,
as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.”224
This hierarchical conception of the Executive Branch, culminating in
the President, helped to shape the Free Enterprise Court’s definition of a
“department head” for appointment purposes under Article II. In an
intriguing feature of the opinion, the Court held that the Securities and
Exchange Commission—a multimember body—could qualify as a
department head in which the power to appoint inferior officers could be
constitutionally vested.225 As the Free Enterprise Court explained, “the
responsive to the Executive Branch of government. But the officers in question answer through the
chain of command that leads ultimately to the Department of Justice and to the President. See supra
note 144. Prior to 1939, the budget process for the judiciary was handled by the Department of Justice,
an awkward state of affairs that provided the impetus for the creation of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts outside the Executive Branch. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost,
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1174 (1996); Judith Resnik, Lecture, Courts In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771,
788 n.48 (2008).
222
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
223
The provision in question vested power in the Securities and Exchange Commission, an
independent regulatory agency, to appoint members of the Board to staggered five-year terms, subject
to removal by the SEC for good cause. Ultimately, the Court held that the insulation of Board members
from presidential removal from office violated the constitutional provision vesting executive power in
the President. Id. at 3155. While the Court did not question the power of Congress to vest executive
power in an independent agency, such as the SEC, whose members enjoy some insulation from
presidential removal, the double layer of insulation accorded members of the Board was deemed
unconstitutional. As the Court explained, the statute “not only protects Board members from removal
except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good cause
exists.” Id. at 3153.
224
Id. at 3155 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
225
In viewing the Commission as a department head for appointment purposes, the Court picked
up a theme from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Freytag, which had similarly portrayed the
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Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not
subordinate to or contained within any other such component, it constitutes
a ‘Departmen[t]’ for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”226 This
definition makes clear that department heads must answer, not to other
officers in the Article II hierarchy, but to the President as the chief
executive.
Given this conception of department heads as answering to the
President, it is not obvious how one could characterize the Chief Justice as
a department head within the Executive Branch. The Chief, to state the
obvious, holds his commission during good behavior. He does not report
to, and cannot be removed from office by, the President. To the extent
department heads must answer to a constitutional superior, the Chief
plainly does not qualify.227
Alternatively, one might portray the Chief as the head of an
administrative department within Article III, but such an argument poses
problems of its own. Article III’s vesting clause plays a role similar to that
in Article II, vesting all of the judicial power in the Supreme Court, and in
lower federal courts, and requiring all courts and tribunals to remain
inferior to the one Court. Just as Article III may well invalidate legislation
multimember Tax Court as the head of a department within the meaning of Article II. Freytag v.
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991). As the Court observed, there was nothing particularly anomalous
about viewing a multimember body as the appointing agency; it specifically noted the example of
“Courts of Law” in rejecting the notion that only an individual can make appointments under Article II.
Completing the thought, the Court observed that the organic act vested the SEC’s powers, including the
power to appoint Board members, in the Commission itself. On this view, the Chairman was not to be
viewed as the department head. Other Commissioners did not report to the Chairman and, unlike the
Chairman who was appointed by the President alone, Commissioners were installed in office through
the usual mode of nomination and Senate confirmation, thus qualifying the Commission as an agency
head within applicable law. In the end, the Court portrayed the Chairman as exercising executive
functions “subject to the full Commission’s policies,” rather than as a department head, and upheld the
Commission as the appointing department head on this basis. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163–64.
226
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 (alteration in original).
227
One might divide the Chief’s judicial and administrative duties and argue that life tenure
attaches only to the judicial work. Such an approach would map nicely onto the arguments of scholars
who contend that Congress might restructure the office of Chief Justice in various ways, perhaps by
assigning the appointment of the Chief to the Court, see Pettys, supra note 1, at 231, 281, or by
imposing term limits on the Chief’s administrative role, see Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1642.
Perhaps on the same theory, Congress could subject the Chief’s administrative duties to executive
oversight and control and thus make the Chief a department head within the meaning of Article II. One
might argue in support of such an approach that Congress gave the Chief a range of non-Article III
duties in the early years. See Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court,
1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (detailing among other activities Chief Justice Jay’s service on the board of the
mint and his later appointment as ambassador to Great Britain). While the Chief can plausibly hold
more than one office under the United States, I find it difficult to imagine a world in which Congress
could empower the President to remove the Chief from his administrative duties as head of the judicial
bureaucracy and replace him with a different department head (presumably one of the President’s own
choosing). The threat to the separation of powers strikes me as fatal to the recognition of such a
presidential role.
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that purports to place a lower court beyond the oversight and control of its
judicial superior,228 so too must officers working for the Third Branch
remain accountable to their judicial superiors. Article II’s provision for
appointment of inferior officers by the courts underscores this point. One
has difficulty seeing how the Chief could be said to be accountable to or
dependent on the Court in the exercise of his administrative duties. The
Chief does not serve as the designee or elected representative of the Court
itself, as in Freytag, and does not submit his appointments to the Court for
review and ratification.
To be sure, not every government official involved in some way with
the administration of justice must answer to the Court. From the early years
of government, Congress placed the marshals outside the Article III
hierarchy. Marshals obviously play a role in the execution of judgments,
serving process, making arrests, and overseeing imprisonment and the
execution of sentences. Whatever the wisdom of housing the marshals in
the Executive Branch, the mechanism clearly complies with the “chain of
dependence” conception articulated in Free Enterprise Fund, with
dependence running to the President. The example of the marshals thus
tells us little about Congress’s power to set up a department within the
judicial bureaucracy and place the Chief at its head.
One might defend the current arrangement as a functional adaptation
to the growth and changing nature of the judicial bureaucracy or as a
reflection of constitutional-moment-style legislation that embodies a
fundamental change in the constitutional order.229 Chief Justice John Jay
presided over a Court that appointed two inferior officers, the crier and the
clerk; court-based appointment did not impose a significant burden on the
Court or interfere with the Court’s primary function of deciding cases.
Today, the AO employs more than 32,000 individuals at some 800
locations nationwide.230 The sheer size of the bureaucracy might seem to
defy effective court-based oversight, especially for Associate Justices who
might prefer to avoid administrative chores. But the argument from size
and complexity does not necessarily argue for sole oversight by the Chief;
228

See Pfander, supra note 23 (contending that the Court’s supremacy entails a power, not subject
to congressional exceptions, to oversee the work of judicial inferiors); see also PFANDER, supra note 22,
at 145–52, 163–64 (same).
229
The argument from functional adaptation recalls the familiar view that the Court should not
insist on strict adherence to the separation of powers but should instead allow adjustments over time.
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 857 (1986) (upholding an
assignment of judicial power to the administrative agency and refusing to articulate “formalistic and
unbending rules”). For an account of adaptation, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds,
87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009), proposing that Congress may have power to work around certain
inconvenient constitutional provisions, particularly where the purpose underlying the provision has little
continuing relevance. Of course, the argument for the use of workarounds to facilitate adaptation has
less force when the text in question seeks to achieve a goal that remains relevant.
230
See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013).
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rather, it argues for delegation to a series of inferior officers who remain
responsive to their superior in the chain of command. Today, the director of
the AO serves as the chief administrative officer of the federal judicial
bureaucracy and as the secretary to the Judicial Conference.231 Court-based
selection of the director would represent only a limited distraction for the
Justices and would occur only once every several years.232
Constitutional-moment arguments owe much to the work of Bruce
Ackerman and his conception of the New Deal as a moment of engaged
lawmaking that effected a lasting change in the constitutional order, despite
the absence of any written constitutional amendment.233 Whatever the
persuasiveness of Ackerman’s account of the New Deal,234 one cannot
readily identify a moment in the growth of the judicial bureaucracy that
would qualify as “constitutional” within the meaning of Ackerman’s
model. Much of initial growth in the judicial bureaucracy occurred during
the Progressive Era, under the stewardship of Chief Justice Taft.235 Further
growth occurred in 1939 with the creation of the Administrative Office.236
But even then, the director of the AO was to be appointed by the Court.237 It
was not until 1990 that Congress altered the appointment mechanism to
vest the appointment power in the Chief.238 Rather than a moment in which
an aroused citizenry proclaimed a new era in judicial administration (if
indeed one can imagine such a thing), we have the drip-by-drip accretion of

231

See id.
Since its inception in 1939, eight individuals have served as director of the Administrative
Office, with an average term of nine years. See id.; Judicial Administration and Organization, FED.
JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_06_01.html (last visited May 24,
2013). In appointing the director of the Administrative Office, some Chiefs have played favorites. See
Fish, supra note 1, at 106–08 (describing Warren’s choice of a “loyal protégé” and Burger’s choice of a
former colleague and future real estate investment partner with whom he had a “close relationship”).
233
See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (describing
Reconstruction and the New Deal as periods of heightened citizen engagement and unconventional
higher lawmaking); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007).
234
For criticisms, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002), and Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional
Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 768
(1992) (book review), highlighting the problem of identifying when such a moment has occurred and
what content to ascribe to it.
235
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 350 (describing the growth of the federal
judicial bureaucracy and the Chief’s appointment power).
236
See Resnik, supra note 3, at 937–38 (recounting the legislative impetus behind the creation of
the Administrative Office); see also PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION (1973).
237
See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, ch. 501, § 302, 53 Stat. 1223 (providing that the
director and assistant director of the Administrative Office shall be “appointed by the Supreme Court of
the United States and hold office at the pleasure of and be subject to removal by the aforesaid Court”).
238
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 307, 104 Stat. 5089, 5112
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)).
232
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authority that occurs when the relevant actors no longer attend to
constitutional limits.
C. Toward a Court-Based Appointment Process
Assuming that Congress cannot vest the Chief with power to appoint
inferior officers, but must vest the power in the Court instead, this section
explores how Congress and the Court might work together to implement a
model of court-based appointment. Obviously, the most straightforward
way to make the transition would be to amend the relevant statutes and
provide for the vesting of appointment authority in the Court, rather than
the Chief. Alternatively, the Court could institute an internal practice of
treating statutes that vest appointment power in the Chief as if they meant
to confer that power on the Chief as the Court’s agent. In other words, the
Chief and the Court could institute a practice of overseeing the Chief’s
appointments such that they could be properly regarded as the Court’s
work. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court noted that appointments by the
Chairman of the SEC could pass muster as appointments by the
Commission itself so long as the appointment is “made ‘subject to the
approval of the Commission.’”239 Similar approval by the Court could help
to address any constitutional objection.
Such a modified appointment practice should not prove particularly
disruptive, and it could nonetheless considerably improve the process. As
Professor Ruger has noted, judicial norms call for deliberation,
consultation, and reason giving.240 It appears that the decision of the
Framers to vest appointment power in the Court, rather than the Chief, was
meant to foster these consultative values. Even though the Court did not
give reasons for the appointment of John Tucker as its first clerk, the Chief
Justice took pains to ensure that the Court as such engaged in a joint
deliberative process before announcing its decision.241 We can assume that
the deliberations focused on the relative merits of the candidates and
resulted in a consensus selection. Although it would be a drastic step, one
can imagine that a Justice, doubting the merits of a proposed appointee,
might file a short dissent, perhaps to highlight procedural concerns. In any
case, the prospect of group deliberation would impose an important
discipline on the appointment process, ensuring that the mix of candidates

239

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 n.13 (2010)
(quoting Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, § 1(b)(2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 568 (2006)).
240
On the importance of deliberation and collective decisionmaking, see Ruger, Appointment
Power, supra note 1, at 385–88.
241
See supra notes 150–51, 154–56 and accompanying text.
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that the Chief put forward for a particular post or posts would appeal
broadly to the Justices.242
Shifting to a court-based appointment process might also improve the
legislative process by eliminating deliberations that focus on the politics or
personal character of the incumbent Chief. On at least three occasions, the
identity of the incumbent Chief appears to have played a role in the
congressional deliberations over how to vest the appointment power. First,
in 1867, the political affiliation of Chief Justice Chase appears to have
persuaded the Republican majority to give him a role in the selection of
bankruptcy registers.243 Later, in 1910, just one month before his death in
July, the Senate focused on the fact that Chief Justice Melvin Fuller would
be exercising power to appoint replacement judges to serve on the
Commerce Court. Justice Fuller was a genial person, but he presided over a
Supreme Court that had increasingly drawn the fire of progressives.244
Progressives sought to shift the appointment power from the Chief to the
Court, but critics of the proposed amendment criticized proponents for
casting aspersions on the current incumbent.245
The identity of the Chief may have also influenced Congress’s
decision to establish a Special Division of the D.C. Circuit to appoint the
independent prosecutors specified in the Ethics in Government Act of
1978.246 Members of Congress close to that curious appointment
mechanism later explained that the decision to create the Special Division
was informed, at least in part, by a desire to avoid vesting Chief Justice
Burger with the power to choose an independent counsel and to place the
242

For an intriguing echo of the argument that the process of appointment differs significantly
when an administrator submits proposed appointments to the oversight of a larger group, see Free
Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.12, observing, in the context of an inquiry into standing, that the
Court “cannot assume, however, that the Chairman would have made the same appointments acting
alone.”
243
For an account, see supra text accompanying notes 182–92.
244
Among the more notorious of the Fuller Court decisions, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), had come down just a few years before the debate and had been the target of focused
progressive criticism, see Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 779–81 (2009)
(describing the galvanizing effect of Theodore Roosevelt’s 1910 attack on the Lochner decision). For a
broader view of the Fuller Court, see OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (1993).
245
See 45 CONG. REC. 7347–50 (1910) (remarks of Sens. Carter, Bailey, and Hale on the subject of
whether the proposal to switch from the Chief to the Court could be seen as an adverse “reflection” on
Chief Justice Fuller); cf. id. at 7351 (remarks of Sen. Gore identifying Chief Justice Taney, author of the
Dred Scott decision, as a Chief who should not be trusted with the appointment power).
246
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873,
authorized the Chief Justice to appoint three members of the D.C. Circuit to serve on a Special Division
that was, in turn, authorized to appoint independent counsel and define the scope of their investigative
power. On the constitutionality of that appointment device, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
upholding the power of the Special Division to make appointments as a court of law, even though the
appointments in question were to positions in another branch of government.
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power instead in the hands of such D.C. Circuit judges as David Bazelon
and Skelly Wright.247 If it were clear that the Court was to make these
appointments, rather than the Chief, Congress would have little occasion to
debate the comparative virtues of specific Chiefs or to create elaborate
statutory workarounds.
Although one can predict that the Associate Justices may not initially
embrace their new duties,248 the Court would have some flexibility in
deciding how far to press for court-based oversight of the Chief’s
appointment role. The Constitution requires the court to appoint inferior
officers but does not address the appointment of employees.249 In the
Court’s view, officers are those who exercise “significant authority” under
the laws of the United States, while employees act as “lesser functionaries”
pursuant to the oversight of officers.250 While the line can be a bit
247

See Letter from Abner J. Mikva to author (Jan. 2012) (on file with the Northwestern University
Law Review) (confirming the story that Democratic members of the House distrusted the Chief Justice
and created a Special Division in part to place the power to appoint independent counsel in other
hands).
248
See Letter from Peter G. Fish to author 1 (July 19, 2012) (on file with the Northwestern
University Law Review) (recounting a conversation with Justice Brennan in which the Justice
“emphatically rejected” any role for the Associate Justices in the selection of administrative personnel
on the ground that the Chief was obliged to shoulder all “administrative burdens”). For further evidence
of Associate Justice antipathy to sharing the Chief’s administrative chores, see Conference on the
Office of Chief Justice (Oct. 15, 1982), in THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 155, 168,
describing Associate Justice McKenna as preferring to be left totally out of administrative work.
249
The inapplicability of Article II to the appointment of employees likely means that the practice
of permitting each Justice to appoint law clerks and other staff does not present a constitutional
problem. For an account of the practice, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE:
THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 42–44, 190–205 (2006), contrasting
the role of law clerks as stenographers in the late nineteenth century with their more expanded role on
the Rehnquist Court. Some might argue that the clerks now exercise real power in the decision of cases,
both in recommending action to their Justices and, through the cert. pool, in shaping the Court’s docket.
See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1290–95 (2010) (arguing that Congress should strip the Court of its law
clerks and force the Justices to do their own work). But law clerks propose and Justices dispose, making
it hard to argue that the clerks occupy inferior offices that require full-Court participation in the
appointment process. Notably, the first Justices to hire law clerks paid for them out of their own
pockets, a fact that tends to support their characterization as employees rather than inferior officers. See
Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His Clerks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 163, 165 (2010)
(recounting the practice of Horace Gray, the first Justice to hire a law clerk).
250
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3160 (2010) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976) (per curiam)). The Court put it this way in a leading
statement:
[I]n the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important
Government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is
directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). Under guidance issued by the Office of Legal
Counsel, officers of the United States include only those individuals who hold an office that is both
“continuing” and that has been delegated a significant portion of the “sovereign” power of the nation.
See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. (Apr.
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unclear,251 the Court can obviously refrain from playing any role in the
appointment of lesser functionaries. Settled law pretty clearly establishes
the clerks of the Supreme and district courts as inferior officers; the Court
treated its clerk as such, and the decision in Ex parte Hennen so regards the
clerks of the district courts.252 In addition, the Court held that special judges
of the Tax Court were inferior officers within the meaning of Article II, as
are the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that
figured in the Free Enterprise Fund decision.253 Presumably, such
precedents suffice to establish that prominent figures in the judicial
bureaucracy, such as the director of the AO, qualify as inferior officers for
whom court-based appointment should be the norm. Hiring practices at
lower levels in the bureaucracy need not change.
As with employees, the Court’s appointment obligations would not
necessarily extend to decisions about how to designate judges for special
judicial service. Here, one must distinguish between the initial appointment
of Article III judges, which has conventionally been thought to require
presidential nomination and senatorial advice and consent, and the
designation of current Article III judges to play a special role within the
Judicial Branch.254 Such designation of existing judges does not obviously
entail the appointment of a new inferior (or principal) officer.255 After all,
the judicial office as understood today includes both the adjudication of
cases and controversies as a member of a specified court and the
performance of additional tasks in accordance with proper designations.
Such additional tasks, as we have seen, could potentially include service on
a wide range of Judicial Conference committees as well as service on a
court of specialized jurisdiction. Rather than filling offices, the Chief’s

16, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf. On such a view,
the range of employees subject to appointment without regard to Article II would be quite broad indeed.
251
Thus, the Court acknowledged that the status of administrative law judges, as officers or
employees, remains a matter of dispute. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
252
See supra text accompanying note 176.
253
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.
254
Some scholars have contended that lower court judges could be regarded as inferior officers, as
befits their status as the judges of inferior courts. If adopted, such a view could presumably clear the
way for the appointment of inferior federal judges by the Court itself, as Professor Burke Shartel
contended some years ago. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, and
Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1930) (arguing that one
might characterize lower court judges as inferior officers within the meaning of Article II, thereby
clearing the way for their appointment by the Supreme Court). For an update of Shartel’s analysis in
light of recent cases, see Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and
Advice and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 824–39 (2006).
255
Congress has instituted an elaborate process of designation and assignment that governs the
eligibility of senior judges. For an account, see Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 19–21.
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designation of judges might well be viewed as specifying what immediate
duties, out of a range of possibilities, the judge should perform.256
This conception of designation conforms to early practice under the
1850 statute that first conferred power on the Chief Justice to identify a
judge from an adjoining district to assist in the case of judicial disability.
There, Congress specifically conferred on the Chief the power to
“designate and appoint” a judge for the purpose.257 But it was clearly
understood that the Chief was to select from among current Article III
judges in making the designation, rather than to appoint new judges to
provide assistance. Similarly, when Congress returned to designation in the
creation of a Commerce Court in 1910, the initial appointment of judges
was to be made by the President and the Senate; the Chief’s designation
power came into play only after the initial five-year term for initial
appointees had run its course.258 In both cases, the designation mechanism
relied on initial presidential appointment and authorized the Chief to assign
existing Article III judges to the positions in question. Designation may
thus be best understood as specifying the work of an Article III judge,
rather than as the appointment of an inferior officer. On this basis, the
Court might well leave intact a wide range of designation authority now
exercised by the Chief.259
The Court’s deference to the Chief’s designation of judges might
extend to such specialized courts as the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation and the FISA courts. To be sure, judges designated for service on
such courts exercise the judicial power of the United States, performing the
core work of overseeing the resolution of cases and controversies. In that
sense, their designation does not differ from other designations, such as
those to address disabilities or temporary workload dislocations. On the
other hand, designation to a specialized court poses a risk that the Chief
256

Congress can impose new duties on an existing officer without running afoul of Article II so
long as the new duties can be considered “germane” to the work already being performed by that
official. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 171–75 (1994); Shoemaker v. United States, 147
U.S. 282, 300–01 (1893). It follows a fortiori that the designation of particular duties from an
established range would not present Appointments Clause problems. But cf. David R. Stras & Ryan W.
Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (arguing that the office of
senior judge would require a separate appointment and that the oversight entailed in designating and
assigning senior judges represents an unconstitutional abridgement of judicial independence).
257
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
258
See supra text accompanying note 196.
259
On the other hand, the simple fact that the Chief designates a sitting Article III judge to fill an
available post does not necessarily address all concerns. It strikes me as relatively easy to maintain that
specialized judicial work, such as that on the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, represents
simply one more element of the core judicial responsibility of adjudicating cases and controversies. But
some designations, such as those of sitting judges to serve as director of the AO or FJC, see supra notes
2–3, would occasion a marked departure from the business of adjudication. In taking up the new task,
the director more closely resembles an officer with new executive responsibilities than a judge on
temporary assignment to a new judicial venue.
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will be perceived as staffing the court with judges who favor a certain
approach to the legal questions likely to come before the tribunal. Critics
have suggested, for example, that Chiefs in the past have favored relatively
conservative designees for the FISA court, Republican judges for the
Special Division, and judges open to procedural reform for the civil rules
committee.260 A collegial designation process would go far to blunt such
criticisms.261
One final challenge lies in drawing the line between offices to which
the Chief can make designations and those to which he makes new
appointments. Obviously, deliberations at the Court could help to inform
this line-drawing puzzle. But at least two factors might help to distinguish
designative offices, which the Chief can fill alone, from appointive offices.
If the office requires the exercise of judicial power and can only be filled
by an Article III judge, the argument for treating it as a designation seems
relatively straightforward. If Article III judges and others can both serve in
an office, such as a membership on the civil rules advisory committee or
the directorship of the AO, then the argument for regarding the
appointment as a mere designation seems harder to sustain. If the office
entails the exercise of law- or policymaking power, then the argument for
regarding it as the sort of inferior office that the Court itself must oversee
becomes harder to resist.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Jay’s scrupulous adherence to a court-based appointment
model sharply contrasts with a modern practice that treats the Chief as the
presumptive appointing authority. Like many functional adaptations to the
growth of the federal government, the Chief’s new role as the head of a
judicial bureaucracy has its defenders. One can certainly sympathize with
arguments from administrative efficiency, and can predict that the Court
might not welcome the burden of sharing the Chief’s administrative
portfolio. Yet the Court’s own decisions refuse to allow arguments from
convenience to trump the lines of accountability sketched out in the
Constitution’s appointment provisions. As the Court recently reaffirmed,
“[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the
hallmarks—of democratic government.”262
It seems likely that the courts were installed as the appointing entity to
put fences around the patronage power of chief judges and to ensure that
offices were to be viewed as part of a public trust for distribution on the
260

See supra notes 4, 48–50 and accompanying text.
See Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 101 (noting the importance of ensuring that any designation
process for senior status judges take account only of genuine administrative needs and not be tainted by
personal animosity or political considerations).
262
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).
261
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basis of merit after due consultation. Granted, we do not need to police
Judicial Branch appointments to ensure democratic accountability; the
people play at best an indirect role in the choice of the Article III judiciary
and the exercise of the judicial power. Yet a growing body of evidence
suggests that hierarchy plays an important role in the structure of the
federal judiciary, with one Supreme Court sitting atop a federal judicial
pyramid. While no one would insist that the Court adjudicate every case or
controversy or approve every appointment in the Third Branch, the
structural imperatives of hierarchy call for the Court to participate in or
oversee adjudication and significant appointment decisions involving
inferior officers. Such oversight would honor the Court’s supremacy and
the Article II provision for appointments by the “courts of law.”
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